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ABSTRACT
The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new
corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance
committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for
attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  QLCCs are
consistent with the Commission’s general approach to improving
corporate governance through specialized committees of independent
directors.  This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits
and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially
apparent.  Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the
absence of incentives for active director monitoring.  This Article
concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.
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INTRODUCTION
The late 1990s was a golden age for corporate America—or so it
seemed. Corporations reported ever-increasing earnings. Stock prices
continually rose, leading market capitalization to an all time high.
Everyone was happy. Investors delighted in the rapidly rising values
of their portfolios, executives received staggering compensation,
employees took comfort in the stability of their jobs and the steady
growth of their retirement funds, and auditors, analysts, and attorneys
collected larger and larger fees. Then, like a house of cards, it all
came crashing down. Suddenly, the public learned that the reported
profits were a sham and that executives had been engaged in massive
fraud. Investors lost billions of dollars, employees lost their jobs and
their retirement savings, and company after company collapsed.
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The crash in stock prices, together with reports of widespread
corporate misconduct, led to demands for regulatory reform to
prevent this debacle from happening again. Although the evidence
indicates that corporate management at companies like Enron, Tyco,
and Worldcom bore primary responsibility for the wrongdoing and
the unprecedented losses,1 many commentators argue that
gatekeepers—including accountants, analysts, and attorneys—were
also responsible.2 These critics argue that conflicts of interest and a
lack of regulatory accountability led gatekeepers to ignore problems
as they developed, asserting that responsible gatekeeper behavior
would have prevented, or at least limited, misconduct.3
Congress, apparently accepting this gatekeeper argument,
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley).4 Notably,
the primary focus of Sarbanes-Oxley is gatekeeper accountability.5
Although the central state law mechanism for monitoring corporate
decisionmaking is the board of directors—and particularly the
independent director—Sarbanes-Oxley did not impose federal
1. See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder, Management Practice Enabled Huge Fraud, 2 Investigations
Find, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at C1 (describing findings of two reports, which concluded that
the chief executive officer of Worldcom fostered fraud that was undertaken by other managers);
William C. Powers, Jr. et al., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the
Board of Directors of Enron Corp., 18–22 (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/ (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing the role of Enron’s
management in the company’s wrongdoing); Tyco Int’l Ltd., Form 8-K (Sept. 10, 2002),
available at http://www.freeedgar.com (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing the
improper and illegal conduct of Tyco’s management and the related errors in the company’s
accounting disclosures).
2. Accountants, analysts, and attorneys provide professional services to corporations (and
to investors). Most importantly, these professionals pledge their reputational capital, acquired
over many years and many clients, to assure the accuracy, or at least the honesty, of the
statements they either make or certify regarding the corporations.
3. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002) (attributing significant responsibility for the collapse of
Enron to outside professional “gatekeepers” such as auditors and attorneys); R. William Ide,
Post-Enron Corporate Governance Opportunities: Creating a Culture of Greater Board
Collaboration and Oversight, 54 MERCER L. REV. 829, 841–45 (2003) (describing widespread
blame of recent corporate failures and frauds on gatekeeper inadequacies).
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)). Officially, this statute is entitled
the “Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002,” and it is
generally referred to as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
5. The provisions of the statute addressing the accountability of gatekeepers are described
infra in Part II.A.
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standards for director liability.6 Similarly, despite a persistent strain of
academic criticism charging that state corporate law is unduly lax in
constraining management behavior,7 Sarbanes-Oxley did not
implement federal limitations on management conduct. Instead,
Congress sought, through Sarbanes-Oxley, to improve corporate
decisionmaking indirectly by imposing new obligations—including
standards of conduct,8 regulation of conflicts,9 and disclosure
obligations10—on outside professionals who perform services for
corporations, auditors, analysts, and attorneys.11
Specifically, with respect to attorneys, section 307 of Sarbanes-
Oxley instructs the Securities and Exchange Commission
(Commission) to adopt minimum standards for attorney conduct,
including a requirement that attorneys report evidence of misconduct
“up the corporate ladder.”
6. Cf. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 693–703 (1974) (advocating federal “minimum standards” for director conduct).
The statute did formalize requirements for the audit committees of public companies that had
previously been addressed by Commission rules and listing standards. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 2003) (setting forth standards for audit
committees).
7. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992) (identifying areas in which
state corporate law is unlikely to produce adequate constraints on management self-dealing);
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect
Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1172–73 (1999) (demonstrating
shortcomings of state law with respect to takeover regulation); Cary, supra note 6, at 696–705
(describing Delaware corporate law as favoring management interests over shareholder
interests and recommending adoption of minimum federal standards).
8. Congress charged the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board with establishing
auditing and related attestation standards, quality control standards, and ethical standards to be
used by public accounting firms in the preparation and issuance of audit reports. § 103, 15
U.S.C.A. § 7213. With respect to attorneys, Congress directed the Commission to issue rules
setting forth minimum standards of conduct. § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
9. For example, Congress amended section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
make it unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to perform an audit for an issuer if the
issuer’s chief executive officer, controller, chief financial officer, or chief accounting officer was
employed by the accounting firm and participated in an audit of the issuer within the preceding
year. § 206, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1. Congress also directed the Commission to adopt rules to
address analyst conflicts of interest in connection with investment banking operations. § 501, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78o-6.
10. See, e.g., § 204, 15 U.S.C.A. 78j-1 (requiring auditors to report to the issuer’s audit
committee all critical accounting policies and practices, all alternative treatments of financial
information that have been discussed with members of management, and all material written
communications between the issuer and management).
11. These provisions of the statute are described in greater detail infra in Part II.A.
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The Commission responded to section 307 by promulgating Rule
205,12 which requires attorneys representing public issuers of
securities to report evidence of misconduct to the chief legal officer of
the issuer, and, in some cases, to the audit committee and/or the
board of directors.13 Importantly, however, the Commission did not
stop there. Rule 205 also provides an alternative mechanism by which
attorneys can fulfill their reporting obligations: the qualified legal
compliance committee (QLCC).14 If an issuer creates a QLCC in
accordance with Rule 205, attorneys may fully satisfy their reporting
obligations under the rule simply by reporting evidence of misconduct
to the QLCC.15
Although the Commission apparently believes that QLCCs—
independent board committees empowered to act independently—
are the best means of identifying, investigating, and responding to
reports of misconduct, the introduction of this alternative mechanism
to accomplish these tasks creates several problems. First, the
introduction of the QLCC represents a departure from congressional
efforts to improve corporate decisionmaking by increasing the
responsibilities of gatekeepers. While we do not defend the emphasis
on gatekeepers in Sarbanes-Oxley as the most appropriate method
for addressing the types of misconduct identified in recent
disclosures,16 we note that questions concerning the efficacy of the
gatekeeper model do not mitigate the problems inherent in
frustrating the structure of the statutory scheme.17
Second, the Commission has failed to consider the costs to
issuers of creating QLCCs—costs that may be substantial. At the
same time, the Commission may have overstated the purported
benefits that QLCCs confer on issuers. Moreover, the creation of the
QLCC provides distinct benefits to the attorneys representing an
12. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
13. Id. § 205.3.
14. Id. § 205.3(c). The requirements for a properly created QLCC are described infra in
Part I.B.2.
15. Id. § 205.3(c)(1).
16. Indeed one of us has criticized congressional efforts to impose gatekeeping obligations
on attorneys. See Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is there a Role for Lawyers in Preventing
Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1130–31 (2003) (arguing that an attorney’s role is
inconsistent with the independence required of an effective gatekeeper).
17. Given the broad scope of Sarbanes-Oxley and the traditional deference given to the
Commission in performing its rulemaking function, we do not go so far as to argue that Rule 205
is subject to a challenge of invalidity.
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issuer. When an attorney reports evidence of misconduct to a QLCC
rather than to an officer or the board of directors, the attorney’s
reporting obligations and exposure to liability are both reduced. Due
to the importance of attorneys as mediating agents in advising their
clients about the decision to create a QLCC, these benefits present a
risk that issuers will face “backdoor” pressure to create QLCCs
stemming from the market for legal services.
Third, although QLCCs reflect the Commission’s vision of the
best means of regulating corporate conduct—through an emphasis on
board structure, including the increasing use of specialized board
committees comprised of independent directors—we question
whether this model of the “specialist director” can address
fundamental problems of director passivity and effectuate a
meaningful difference in the behavior of boards of directors.18 To
consider the potential effectiveness of QLCCs, we look to the role
and the impact of audit committees, which are, we argue, analogous
to QLCCs in important ways.19 In light of the ambiguous evidence on
audit committee effectiveness, we conclude by considering alternative
mechanisms for improving director incentives to identify and respond
to evidence of corporate misconduct.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes Rule 205,
beginning with the political context in which Congress enacted
Sarbanes-Oxley and the history of the Commission’s efforts to
regulate attorney conduct and then turning to the provisions of Rule
205. Part II considers the potential benefits and costs to the issuer of
creating a QLCC, as well as the incentives facing attorneys in advising
an issuer to create a QLCC. Because QLCCs are, as yet, an untested
tool, we look to the experience with audit committees for guidance in
predicting the likely success of QLCCs in addressing misconduct.
Finally, Part III identifies alternative mechanisms to increase director
accountability as a means of addressing the principal limitation of
QLCCs—the failure to provide sufficient incentives to overcome
director passivity. Specifically, we consider greater director liability
exposure, changes to director compensation, and alternative
processes for selecting directors. Although each of these methods is
18. The Commission’s emphasis on the importance of independent and expert directors
serving as members of audit committees is described infra in Part II.C.1.
19. The Commission’s initiatives with respect to audit committees are described infra in
Part II.C.1.
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imperfect, collectively they illustrate the limitations of the
Commission’s current regulatory approach.20
I.  BACKGROUND TO RULE 205
In section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress directed the
Commission to adopt minimum standards of attorney conduct,
including a requirement that attorneys report evidence of misconduct
up the corporate ladder.21 Responding to this directive, the
Commission adopted Rule 205, which sets forth minimum standards
of professional conduct for attorneys appearing before the
Commission,22 including a requirement that attorneys representing an
issuer report evidence of misconduct up the ladder.23 The
Commission, however, went further, introducing the QLCC as an
alternative mechanism for reporting, as well as investigating and
responding to, misconduct.24
To understand the significance of Rule 205 and the QLCC
alternative, it is important to consider the background to the rule.
Accordingly, in Section A, we summarize the political context in
which Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley and the history of the
Commission’s efforts to regulate attorney conduct. In Section B, we
focus directly on Rule 205, concentrating on the rule’s reporting
obligations and the requirements for creating a QLCC.
A. The Congressional Mandate: Section 307 and Gatekeeper
Accountability
In the wake of disclosures of extensive wrongdoing and
unprecedented losses to investors at Enron, Tyco, Worldcom, and
other corporations, Congress undertook the task of adopting
federal legislation designed to reduce the risk of future
20. Importantly, the analysis contained in this Article is confined to evaluating QLCCs
from a corporate governance perspective. The Article does not include an evaluation of whether
it is appropriate for the Commission to promulgate standards of attorney conduct or an
evaluation of the Commission’s recently promulgated standards. For an analysis of these
questions, see Fisch & Rosen, supra note 16, at 1097.
21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2003).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 205.
23. Id. § 205.3(b).
24. Id. § 205.3(c).
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misconduct.25 Congress focused its efforts primarily on advisors—
accountants, analysts, and attorneys who provide professional
services to corporations—rather than on the executives who run
the corporations (and who bore primary responsibility for the
wrongdoing) or the directors who oversee the decisions made by
the executives (and who acquiesced in the wrongdoing). The
rationale for this approach appears to be a view that gatekeepers
were largely to blame for the failures in corporate governance.
Under this view, conflicts of interest and the absence of regulatory
accountability permitted gatekeepers to ignore critical problems
while earning enormous fees from their clients.26 Consequently, the
reforms of Sarbanes-Oxley are principally directed toward
improving the incentives and responsibilities of gatekeepers—
especially accountants.27
As originally introduced in Congress, Sarbanes-Oxley did not
contain a provision addressing standards of attorney conduct.28 A
letter written by Professor Richard Painter, together with forty other
law professors, seems to have been a key factor triggering the
inclusion of attorney conduct within the reforms of Sarbanes-Oxley.
The letter urged the Commission to compel securities lawyers to
report evidence of wrongdoing up the ladder within each issuer they
represent.29 Professor Painter suggested that the Commission both
promulgate a rule clearly requiring disclosure to the issuer’s directors
25. See Greg Hitt, Bush Signs Sweeping Legislation Aimed at Curbing Corporate Fraud,
WALL ST. J., July 31, 2002, at A4 (describing reform legislation as responsive to reported
scandals at Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco, Qwest Communications, and WorldCom, among
others).
26. This emphasis on gatekeepers may not be appropriate. See, e.g., Fisch & Rosen, supra
note 16, at 1130–31 (questioning whether attorneys can function as effective gatekeepers).
27. The second title of Sarbanes-Oxley implements a number of reforms that are designed
to enhance the independence of accountants who audit financial statements. Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, §§ 201–209, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7231–7234 (West Supp. 2003) (amending section 10A of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000)).  Analysts are also the subject of
enhanced scrutiny and regulation. § 501, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-6.  These reforms and regulations
are described infra in Part II.A.
28. See, e.g., Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act
of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002) (containing no provisions addressing attorney conduct);
Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Act of 2002, Report of the Senate
Committee of Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 107-205, 107th Cong., 2d. Sess.
(2002) (containing no provisions addressing attorney conduct).
29. Letter from Richard W. Painter, Professor of Law at University of Illinois College of
Law, to Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC (March 7, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/corporateresponsibility/pitt.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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and enforce the rule vigorously.30 The Commission, through General
Counsel David Becker, responded to Professor Painter’s letter by
referencing the lengthy history and controversy surrounding the
appropriate role of the Commission in regulating attorney conduct.31
The history dates to the 1970s. In National Student Marketing,32
the Commission took the position that attorneys who knew that their
client had entered into a merger by making materially misleading
disclosures had an affirmative duty to prevent the merger.33 In
particular, the Commission stated that if the client refused to follow
the attorneys’ recommendation to make corrective disclosure, “the
attorneys should have withdrawn from the representation and
informed the shareholders or the Commission.”34 The Commission
later confirmed its position. In 1981, the Commission, in In re Carter
(Carter & Johnson),35 explained that an attorney who is aware of a
client’s continuing and substantial violations of the securities laws is
required to “take[] prompt steps to end the client’s noncompliance.”36
The Commission then stated that an attorney’s obligations could
extend to reporting evidence of misconduct up the corporate ladder
to the board of directors.37
At the same time, the Commission considered direct rulemaking
that would require attorneys to report evidence of misconduct up the
ladder. In November 1978, the Institute for Public Interest
Representation at Georgetown University Law Center asked the
Commission to amend Rule 2(e) “to require an attorney who
discovers that his client has been guilty of a material misstatement or
omission to bring the facts and legal implications to the attention of
management.”38 The Commission responded by publishing the
30. Id.
31. Letter from David Becker, General Counsel, SEC, to Richard W. Painter, Professor of
Law, University of Illinois College of Law (Mar. 28, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
32. SEC v. Nat. Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
33. Id. at 700.
34. Id.
35. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at
84,145 (Feb. 28, 1981).
36. Id. at 84,172.
37. Id.
38. Robert J. Wilczek, Corporate Confidentiality: Problems and Dilemmas of Corporate
Counsel, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 228 (1983); see also H. Lowell Brown, The Dilemma of
Corporate Counsel Faced with Client Misconduct: Disclosure of Client Confidences or
Constructive Discharge, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 777, 805 n.97 (1996) (describing the proposal).
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proposal for public comment.39 After the decision in Carter &
Johnson, the Commission also took the unusual step of publishing a
second request for comment, specifically focusing on the standard of
attorney conduct articulated by the decision.40 These efforts were
highly controversial. The private bar charged the Commission both
with acting beyond the scope of its authority to become a putative bar
association and with improperly interfering with an attorney’s
obligation of client confidentiality.41
The Commission subsequently retreated from its attempt to
implement standards of attorney conduct through litigation and
rulemaking.42 In a 1982 speech by Commission General Counsel
Edward Greene, the Commission stated that, henceforth, it would
adhere to a policy of restricting disciplinary efforts against attorneys
until there had been a judicial finding that the attorney had violated
the federal securities laws.43 The Commission reaffirmed this position
in a 1988 release, observing that it would continue to adhere to its
position of using Rule 102(e) proceedings against attorneys “only
where the attorney’s conduct has already provided the basis for a
judicial or administrative order finding a securities violation in a non-
rule [102(e)] proceeding.”44
The Commission maintained this basic position over the course
of the next fifteen years, although actions against attorneys, from time
to time, seemed to indicate that the Commission believed that
39. Request for Comments on Petition Concerning Disclosure of Relationships Between
Attorneys and Registrants, Exchange Act Release No. 16,045, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,144, at 82,049 (July 25, 1979); Brown, supra note 38, at 805 n.98.
40. Securities and Exchange Commission, Request for Comments on Standard of Conduct
Constituting Unethical or Improper Professional Practice Before the Commission, 46 Fed. Reg.
48,233 (Oct. 1, 1981).
41. See Wilczek, supra note 38, at 230–31 (noting “objections . . . to the implicit assertion
that the Commission has the authority to impose substantive standards . . . . [and that] it is
contrary to the attorney-client privilege and to the ethical obligations to maintain client
confidences”).
42. See Denial of Petition for Rule-Making Concerning Disclosure of Relationships
Between Attorneys and Registrants, 45 Fed. Reg. 30,454 (May 8, 1980) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240 (2003)) (describing the Commission’s withdrawal of the proposed rule); Susan P. Koniak,
When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1260
(2003) (describing the way the Commission “let the proposed Carter & Johnson rule die a quiet
death”).
43. Edward F. Greene, Remarks to the New York County Lawyer’s Association, [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,089, at 84,802 (Jan. 18, 1982).
44. Disciplinary Proceedings Involving Professionals Appearing or Practicing Before the
Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 25,893, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,427 (July 13, 1988) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 201.102(e)).
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securities lawyers have an affirmative obligation to address client
misconduct. For example, in In re Gutfreund,45 the Commission
refrained from naming the chief legal officer as a respondent in its
section 21(a) report despite the fact that he had been apprised of
criminal misconduct by another executive.46 Nonetheless, the
Commission stated that legal and compliance officers who learn of
misconduct are “obligated to take affirmative steps to ensure that
appropriate action is taken to address the misconduct,” including
“disclosure of the matter to the entity’s board of directors, resignation
from the firm, or disclosure to regulatory authorities.”47 The
Commission, however, neither articulated clear standards of conduct
nor adopted a more vigorous enforcement policy.48
In responding to Professor Painter’s letter, General Counsel
Becker referenced this history and stated that the Commission had,
since Carter & Johnson, declined to use Rule 102(e) as a mechanism
for enforcing standards of attorney conduct.49 General Counsel
Becker then stated that reconsideration of the Commission’s position
would more appropriately be undertaken in the context of
congressional action.50
The Commission’s response subsequently came to the attention
of Senator John Edwards. In June 2002, just weeks before the
adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley,51 Senator Edwards wrote Commission
Chairman Harvey Pitt in reference to Professor Painter’s letter and
the Commission’s response.52 Senator Edwards stated that, in his
view, “a lawyer with knowledge of managers’ serious, material, and
unremedied violations of federal securities law should have an
obligation to inform the board of those violations.”53 Senator Edwards
went on to assert that the obligation should be imposed as a matter of
federal law or regulation and that “[r]ecognition and enforcement of
45. In re Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,067 (Dec. 3,
1992).
46. Id. at 83,608–09.
47. Id. at 83,609.
48. E.g., id.; In re Kern, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,815, at 82,004
(June 21, 1991).
49. Letter from David Becker to Richard W. Painter, supra note 31.
50. Id.
51. President Bush signed Sarbanes-Oxley into law on July 30, 2002. Hitt, supra note 25.
52. Letter from John Edwards, United States Senator from North Carolina, to Harvey Pitt,
SEC Chairman (June 18, 2002), reprinted in 148 CONG. REC. S5,652, S5,652–53 (daily ed. June
18, 2002).
53. Id., reprinted in 148 CONG. REC. S5,652, S5,653 (daily ed. June 18, 2002).
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this important but limited obligation could prevent substantial harms
to shareholders and the public.”54 Senator Edwards then asked
Chairman Pitt whether the Commission intended to enforce this
minimum standard of conduct for securities lawyers and, if not,
sought Chairman Pitt’s assistance in drafting appropriate legislation
to create such an obligation.55
On July 10, 2002, less than a month after his letter to Chairman
Pitt, Senator Edwards introduced the Edwards Amendment to Senate
Resolution 2673, which, with essentially no debate, was adopted and
codified as section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley.56 The statute directed the
Commission, within 180 days of its enactment, to adopt rules
requiring attorneys (1) to report evidence of issuer misconduct up the
corporate ladder to the issuer’s chief legal officer or chief executive
officer, and (2) in the absence of an appropriate response, to report
the misconduct further up the ladder to the issuer’s audit committee,
another independent board committee, or the full board of directors.57
In response to this statutory mandate, on November 21, 2002, the
Commission published for comment proposed Rule 205.58 The
proposed rule received 167 letters of comment.59 On January 23, 2003,
the Commission adopted Rule 205.60
B. Commission Rulemaking: Rule 205 and the Creation of the QLCC
1. The Reporting Obligations. Consistent with the mandate of
section 307, Rule 205 requires any attorney61 who becomes aware of
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See 148 CONG. REC. S6,551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)
(introducing the Edwards Amendment 4187 to Senate Resolution 2673).
57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2003).
58. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act
Release No. 47,276, [2002–2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,802, at 86,513
(Nov. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Proposing Release].
59. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act
Release No. 47,276, [2002–2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,823, at 87,070
(Jan. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Adopting Release].
60. Id. at 87,069. Although the Adopting Release is dated January 29, 2003, the
Commission adopted the Rule on January 23, 2003. Elizabeth S. Stong, The SEC Adopts a Rule
on Attorney Conduct, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2003, at 9.
61. The rule applies to attorneys “appearing and practicing before the Commission,” which
is defined in Rule 205.2(a) to include attorneys transacting any business before the Commission,
representing an issuer in a Commission proceeding or investigation, providing advice in respect
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evidence of a material violation of the securities laws, a material
breach of fiduciary duty, or a similar material violation,62 to report the
matter to the issuer’s chief legal officer.63 If, following this first step,
the reporting attorney reasonably believes that neither the chief legal
officer nor the chief executive officer has provided an appropriate
response,64 the attorney must report the matter to others within the
issuer: the audit committee, another independent committee, or the
entire board of directors.65
of the securities laws, or advising whether or not information or materials must be filed with the
Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a) (2003).
62. “Material violation” is defined as “a material violation of an applicable United States
federal or state securities law, a material breach of a fiduciary duty arising under United States
federal or state law, or a similar material violation of any United States federal or state law.” Id.
§ 205.2(i). A “breach of fiduciary duty” refers to “any breach of a fiduciary of similar duty
[owed to an issuer] under an applicable federal or state statute or at common law, including but
not limited to misfeasance, nonfeasance, abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and approval of
unlawful transactions.” Id. § 205.2(d).
63. The attorney may also report the matter to both the chief legal officer and the chief
executive officer. Id. § 205.3(b)(1).
64. The rule defines an “appropriate response” as a response after which the reporting
attorney reasonably believes: (1) “that no material violation [or material breach] has occurred,
is on going, or is about to occur; that the issuer has, as necessary, adopted appropriate remedial
measures”; or that the issuer has “retained or directed an attorney to review the reported
evidence”; and (2) that the issuer either has “substantially implemented any remedial
recommendations made by [the investigating] attorney” or has been advised by the investigating
attorney that the attorney may assert a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer in any
investigation or proceeding related to the reported evidence. Id. § 205.2(b). In addition, the rule
defines “reasonably believes” to mean “that the attorney believes the matter in question and
that the circumstances are such that the belief is not unreasonable.” Id. § 205.2(m).
65. Id. § 205.3(b)(3). For purposes of the rule, “independent” directors are those directors
who are not employed, either directly or indirectly, by the issuer, and an “independent”
committee is a committee comprised solely of independent directors. Id. § 205.2(k)(1). The
Adopting Release, however, states that “the Commission anticipates that these provisions
[relating to the independence of directors] will be amended to conform to the final rules
defining who is an ‘independent’ director under Section 301 of the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act, upon
adoption of those rules.” Adopting Release, supra note 59, at 87,083. Section 301 requires the
Commission to direct, by rule, the national securities exchanges and associations to prohibit the
listing of any security of an issuer that is not in compliance with specified requirements relating
to the independence, authority, responsibilities, functioning, and funding of expenses of audit
committees. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(1) (West Supp. 2003). The
Commission adopted these rules on April 25, 2003. Standards Relating To Listed Company
Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 47,654, [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 86,902, at 87,402 (Apr. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Listed Company Audit Committee
Release]. Under these rules, which amend section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a
member of an audit committee is not considered independent if he or she accepts any advisory,
consulting, or other compensatory fee from the issuer, other than in his or her capacity as a
member of the board of directors, or is affiliated with the issuer or any of its subsidiaries. §§
201–209, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7231–7234 (amending section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000)).
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Rule 205 also requires the chief legal officer, upon receipt of a
report of a possible material violation or material breach, to conduct
a reasonable inquiry to determine whether or not the reported
violation or breach has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.66
In the event the officer concludes that a material violation or a
material breach has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur, the
rule requires that the officer take all reasonable steps to cause the
issuer to adopt an appropriate response and to advise the reporting
attorney of the officer’s actions.67
These reporting-up requirements do not, however, apply in all
circumstances. Rule 205 departs from the reporting structure
established by section 307 by creating a limited exception to the
reporting obligations in the case of an issuer that has created a
QLCC. The QLCC is designed to serve as an alternative mechanism
for receiving reports of misconduct and for investigating and
responding to the allegations contained in those reports.68 If an issuer
has established a QLCC, then, rather than reporting evidence of a
material violation or a material breach to the issuer’s chief legal
officer, an attorney may simply report the matter to the QLCC.69
Similarly, rather than conducting an inquiry to determine whether or
not a reported violation or breach has occurred, is occurring, or is
about to occur, the chief legal officer may refer the matter to the
QLCC.70 Importantly, upon reporting a matter to the QLCC, a
reporting attorney is relieved of all further obligations under the
rule,71 and, upon referring a report to a QLCC, the chief legal officer
is similarly relieved of further obligations under the rule.72
As yet, the QLCC has received little attention from
commentators. Those comments provided to the Commission in
response to the Proposing Release focused on minor components of
the QLCC’s operational structure. As the Commission reported in
the Adopting Release, “[c]ommenters generally approved of the
66. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2).
67. Id.
68. Adopting Release, supra note 59, at 87,082, 87,089.
69. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c)(1).
70. Id. § 205.3(c)(2).
71. Id. § 205.3(c)(1).
72. Id. § 205.3(c)(2); see Adopting Release, supra note 59, at 87,089 (“[T]he QLCC . . .
would be responsible for carrying out the steps required by Section 307 of the [Sarbanes-Oxley]
Act.”).
FISCH.DOC 06/21/04 4:00 PM
2003] QLCCS AND ATTORNEY CONDUCT RULES 531
QLCC in concept, although several proposed changes in how it
would work.”73
In contrast to the QLCC, which commentators largely accepted
without objection, commentators strongly criticized the Commission’s
efforts to require reporting attorneys to make “noisy withdrawals.”74
As originally proposed, Rule 205 would have required an attorney
who reports evidence of a material violation or a material breach to
the chief legal officer to make, as a second step, a noisy withdrawal if
the attorney
does not receive an appropriate response, or has not received a re-
sponse in a reasonable time, to his or her report, and the attorney
reasonably believes that a material violation is ongoing or is about
to occur and is likely to result in substantial injury to the financial in-
terest or property of the issuer or of investors.75
To make a noisy withdrawal, an attorney must both withdraw from
representing an issuer and notify the Commission of the withdrawal. 76
73. Adopting Release, supra note 59, at 87,089.
74. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act
Release No. 47,282, [2002–2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,824, at 87,112–
13 (Jan. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Second Proposing Release].
Commentators also criticized the Commission’s efforts to impose record-keeping
obligations on reporting attorneys and chief legal officers. Adopting Release, supra note 59, at
87,085–86. In the Proposing Release, the Commission sought to require attorneys to create
contemporaneous records concerning their reports of misconduct and the responses to the
reports. Proposing Release, supra note 58, at 86,535–36. The Commission also sought to require
chief legal officers to document any inquiry conducted in response to a report of misconduct. Id.
at 86,536–37. Those commenting on the Proposing Release criticized these requirements on the
grounds that the obligations “could be an impediment to open and candid discussions between
attorneys and their issuer clients,” that the obligations had “the potential to create a conflict of
interest between the lawyer and his or her client,” and that the obligations “might increase the
issuer’s vulnerability in litigation.” Adopting Release, supra note 59, at 87,085. In light of these
comments, the Commission concluded that “[a]t least at the present time, the potential harms
from mandating documentation may not justify the potential benefits” and refrained from
including the record-keeping obligations in Rule 205. Id.
75. Proposing Release, supra note 58, at 86,541. Importantly, the requirement that the
attorney make a noisy withdrawal is not applicable in situations in which the attorney has
reported the evidence to a QLCC. See id. (stating that the noisy withdrawal requirement only
applies to “an attorney who has reported evidence of a material violation under paragraph 3(b)
of [Rule 205] rather than paragraph 3(c)”).
76. The notice to the Commission was to indicate that the withdrawal was based on
professional considerations and to disaffirm any document that the attorney reasonably
believed to be materially false or misleading.
FISCH.DOC 06/21/04 4:00 PM
532 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:517
The Commission described the noisy withdrawal provision as
generating widespread objections.77 The Commission explained that
“[s]ome commenters objected to the proposal because they are of the
view that the Commission does not have the statutory authority to
require ‘noisy withdrawal,’”78 while others were “concerned that the
provision would conflict with longstanding requirements under state
ethics laws and therefore would infringe on the jurisdiction of state
ethics-setting bodies.”79 “One commentator argued that such a
provision would subject attorneys to conflicting liability claims,
whether or not they complied with the rule,”80 and “several
commentators believed that the rule would not further the
Commission’s goals because it would cause clients to exclude
attorneys from meetings where information was exchanged that could
lead an attorney to believe a material violation had been
committed.”81
In response to these criticisms, the Commission did not include a
noisy withdrawal requirement as part of Rule 205.82 Instead, it
deferred action on this proposal, extending the comment period until
April 7, 2003.83 At the same time, the Commission issued a new
release soliciting comments on both its original proposal and an
alternative proposal.84 The alternative proposal would require
attorneys to withdraw from the representation of an issuer in a
narrower set of circumstances. It would also require the issuer, rather
than the attorney, to report the withdrawal to the Commission.85
2. The Requirements of the QLCC. The QLCC provides an
alternative mechanism for attorneys to report evidence of misconduct
as well as for issuers to investigate and respond to allegations of
77. Second Proposing Release, supra note 74, at 87,112.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 87,113.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Adopting Release, supra note 59, at 87,070.
83. Id.; Second Proposing Release, supra note 74, at 87,113.
84. Second Proposing Release, supra note 74, at 87,111. As in the case of the initial
proposal, the noisy withdrawal requirement of the alternative proposal is not applicable in
situations in which the attorney has reported the evidence to a QLCC. Id. at 87,115.
85. At the time this Article was published, the proposals concerning noisy withdrawal were
still pending.
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misconduct.86 Rule 205.2(k) imposes precise requirements concerning
the composition of the committee, the authority it must possess, and
the procedures that it must follow in its operations.87
The QLCC must be duly created by the board of directors, with
authority to act in accordance with the requirements of Rule 205.88
The issuer may designate its audit committee or another existing
committee to serve as the QLCC, so long as the composition of the
committee satisfies the requirements of the rule.89 In any event, the
committee must be comprised of at least one member of the issuer’s
audit committee and at least two other independent directors.90
The issuer’s board must delegate specific authority and
responsibility to the QLCC.91 In particular, Rule 205.2(k)(3) provides
that the QLCC must have the authority and the responsibility to
inform the chief legal officer and the chief executive officer of a
report of evidence of a material violation or a material breach92 and to
determine whether an investigation regarding a report is necessary.93
In the event the QLCC determines that an investigation is necessary,
the committee must have the authority and the responsibility to
inform the audit committee or the entire board of directors,94 to
initiate an investigation,95 and to retain any additional expert
personnel deemed necessary.96 Upon the conclusion of the
investigation, the QLCC must have the authority and the
responsibility to recommend that the issuer implement an appropriate
response to the misconduct97 and to inform the chief legal officer, the
chief executive officer, and the entire board of directors of the results
86. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c) (2003).
87. Id. § 205.2(k). Rule 205.3(c) also specifically requires that the issuer must have formed
the committee prior to receipt of a report of a material violation or a material breach from an
attorney or prior to a referral of a report from the chief legal officer. Id. § 205.3(c)(1).
88. Id. § 205.2(k)(3).
89. Id. § 205.2(k).
90. Id. § 205.2(k)(1).
91. Id. § 205.2(k)(3).
92. Id. § 205.2(k)(3)(i).
93. Id. § 205.2(k)(3)(ii).
94. Id. § 205.2(k)(3)(ii)(A).
95. Id. § 205.2(k)(3)(ii)(B).
96. Id. § 205.2(k)(3)(ii)(C).
97. Id. § 205.2(k)(3)(iii)(A).
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of the inquiry and of the appropriate remedial measures to be
adopted by the issuer.98
Rule 205.2(k) also specifies the manner in which a QLCC is to
operate. The QLCC is required to adopt “written procedures for the
confidential receipt, retention, and consideration of any report” of a
material violation or a material breach.99 Decisions of the QLCC are
to be made by majority vote.100 Finally, the QLCC must be specifically
authorized to take “appropriate action” in the event the issuer fails in
any “material respect” to implement its recommendations.101 In
particular, the QLCC must have the authority to notify the
Commission of the issuer’s failure to implement its
recommendations.102
II.  PROBLEMS WITH QLCCS
Introducing the QLCC in Rule 205 as an alternative mechanism
for reporting, investigating, and responding to misconduct not only
reflects a departure from the structure of section 307, it creates
several problems. We begin by examining the way the introduction of
the QLCC shifts the focus of reform efforts from attorneys as
gatekeepers to the structure and independence of boards of directors.
We then consider the expected benefits and costs of QLCCs and,
relatedly, the role of attorneys as mediating agents in an issuer’s
decision whether or not to create a QLCC. Finally, to assist in
predicting the potential value of QLCCs, we review the history and
the effect of the Commission’s previous efforts to limit corporate
misconduct through the use of audit committees—committees that
are in many ways similar to QLCCs.
98. Id. § 205.2(k)(3)(iii)(B). The requirement that the QLCC recommend appropriate
remedial measures to the issuer reflects a retreat from the Commission’s initial position.
Initially, the Commission proposed that the QLCC have the authority and the responsibility to
“direct the issuer to adopt appropriate remedial measures.” Proposing Release, supra note 58,
at 86,528. The change to merely recommending an appropriate response, as opposed to
directing the adoption of the response, “responds to comments that the proposed rule would be
in conflict with established corporate governance models insofar as the QLCC would have the
explicit authority to compel a board of directors to take certain remedial actions.” Adopting
Release, supra note 59, at 87,082.
99. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(2).
100. Id. § 205.2(k)(iii)(A).
101. Id. § 205.2(k)(3)(iii)(4).
102. Id. The rule does not, however, require the QLCC to notify the Commission of the
issuer’s failure.
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A. The Impact of QLCCs on Attorneys as Gatekeepers
Congress, in enacting Sarbanes-Oxley, focused primarily on
improving corporate decisionmaking indirectly by increasing the
accountability of gatekeepers—accountants, analysts, and attorneys.103
Accountants, and the auditing function they provide, are the principal
focus of these efforts. Section 201, for example, prohibits auditors
from providing specified non-audit services contemporaneously with
an audit.104 Section 202 requires that the audit committee preapprove
all substantive non-auditing services.105 Section 203 prohibits the lead
audit partner from performing audit services for more than five
consecutive years.106 Section 206 prohibits an auditor from performing
services for an issuer if the chief executive officer, chief financial
officer, controller, or chief accounting officer of the issuer was
employed by the auditor within one year of the date of initiation of
the audit.107 Congress further mandated, in section 204, that every
auditor report directly to the audit committee all critical accounting
policies and practices, all alternative treatments of financial
information within generally accepted accounting principles that have
been discussed with management, implications of their use, the
auditor’s preferred treatment of the information, and any written
communication between the auditor and management.108
Sarbanes-Oxley also focuses on securities analysts and the
research function that they provide. In section 501, Congress directed
the Commission to adopt rules designed to mitigate the conflicts of
interest that arise when analysts recommend stocks (and other equity
securities) in research reports and through public appearances.109
103. A few provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley address management conduct. For example,
section 304 requires the chief legal officer and the chief financial officer to reimburse the issuer
for any bonus received and for any profit received from the sale of stock during the one-year
period following the publication of financial information that, as a result of misconduct, fails to
comply in a material way with any financial reporting requirement and so requires the
preparation of an accounting restatement. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 304, 15 U.S.C.A. §
7243 (West Supp. 2003). Similarly, section 402 prohibits issuers from making personal loans to
their executives and directors. § 402, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m.
104. § 201, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1.
105. § 202, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1.
106. § 203, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1.
107. § 206, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1.
108. § 204, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1.
109. § 501, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-6. See generally Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities
Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1076–77 (2003)
(describing section 501).
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In the same vein, Congress sought to enhance the gatekeeping
function of attorneys.110 Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires the
Commission to adopt a regulatory framework in which attorneys are
obligated to serve as gatekeepers for their clients by reporting
evidence of misconduct up the corporate ladder. Although the
reporting obligations imposed by Rule 205 implement the
gatekeeping requirement specified by the statute, the Commission, at
the same time, departed from the gatekeeping approach by
introducing the QLCC. Specifically, a QLCC enables attorneys to
escape the burden, and the risks, of the reporting obligations imposed
by section 307 and Rule 205 merely by reporting evidence of
misconduct to a committee of the board of directors.
How does the introduction of the QLCC undermine the role of
attorneys as gatekeepers? Once an issuer has created a QLCC, an
attorney may simply report evidence of misconduct to the committee.
The attorney is relieved of any obligation to consider the strength of
the evidence, the seriousness of the misconduct, or the
appropriateness of the issuer’s response. In addition, the attorney
need not consider the impact of the report on the functioning of the
committee or the issuer. The attorney need not evaluate the quality of
the issuer’s investigation of, and response to, the allegations in the
report, and the attorney almost certainly will not participate in the
formulation of the response. As the significance of the decision to
make a report is reduced, the attorney may consider the decision to
report less carefully. As a result, rather than assisting the issuer in
identifying, investigating, and responding to misconduct, the attorney
may overreport, leading to excessive indications of misbehavior, from
the most trivial to the most grave, based on little independent
investigation or analysis.111
The introduction of the QLCC shifts the responsibility for
addressing misconduct from attorneys to the board. The QLCC bears
all responsibility for compliance with Rule 205, from receiving reports
of misconduct, to probing the allegations contained in the reports, to
110. Note, however, that the notion that attorneys might serve as effective gatekeepers has
provoked some degree of controversy. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3, at 1406–19 (describing the
debate over the attorney’s role as gatekeeper and advocating that the Commission adopt rules
to enhance the gatekeeping function of attorneys); Fisch & Rosen, supra note 16, at 1100
(questioning whether or not the gatekeeping function is consistent with the role of the securities
lawyer).
111. See Fisch & Rosen, supra note 16, at 1126–27 (warning that the reporting-up
requirement may lead to overreporting by risk averse attorneys).
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designing appropriate remedial measures. Thus, the QLCC shifts the
focus of reform efforts from gatekeepers to the board of directors.
The shift in focus from attorneys to independent directors is not
necessarily misguided.112 Although some commentators have blamed
gatekeepers for recent corporate governance scandals, others have
faulted the structure and passivity of boards of directors.113 The
gatekeeper model is controversial, and, indeed, some commentators
have argued that advisors who provide professional services to issuers
face pressures in the market that prevent them from operating as
effective gatekeepers.114 Attorneys in particular may be poorly
positioned to act as gatekeepers because, in addition to these market
pressures, they lack the independence and information to monitor
management in a meaningful way.
Moreover, rather than gatekeepers, state law has consistently
emphasized the board of directors, and, particularly, the independent
director, as the appropriate mechanism for monitoring
management.115 Similarly, since the 1970s, the Commission has
consistently espoused the view that effective corporate governance is
best achieved through increased reliance on monitoring by specialized
112. We do not argue that this shift in focus invalidates the portion of Rule 205 that creates
the QLCC alternative. The QLCC is consistent with the general statutory objective of
establishing governance mechanisms that reduce the risk of corporate misconduct. The statute
explicitly endorses the role of specialist committees as one of these mechanisms by codifying the
role of audit committees in section 301. Additionally, courts have generally deferred to the
Commission’s rulemaking efforts. But see Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (rejecting the Commission’s authority to promulgate a one share/one vote requirement
based on its authority to regulate the proxy solicitation process).
113. These critics have posited that a lack of independence from managers and the failure to
oversee the activities in which managers were engaged caused boards of directors to condone
misconduct. See, e.g., Ide, supra note 3, at 839 (arguing that boards of directors failed to perform
their oversight function because they “have developed a set of behaviors in which deference to,
and rubber-stamping of, [chief executive officer] decision-making is the norm”); Stuart L. Gillan
& John D. Martin, Financial Engineering, Corporate Governance, and the Collapse of Enron 3
(The Center for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 2002-01, 2002), available at
http://www.be.udel.edu/ccg/research_files/CCGWP2002-1.pdf (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (asserting that “a lack of board independence and oversight” was one of the primary
reasons behind the collapse of Enron).
114. E.g., Ide, supra note 3, at 841 (“The culture of cross-selling and disclosed conflicts lead
to complacent audits and aggressive accounting decision-making.”); Gillan & Martin, supra note
113, at 3–4 (“[T]he large consulting fees (relative to audit fees) received by auditors from the
same client may compromise the auditor’s independence.”).
115. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 287–90 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(emphasizing the importance of an independent board of directors exercising oversight
regarding the decision to hire and then terminate executive Michael Ovitz).
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committees of independent directors.116 In particular, the Commission
has directed its efforts to the structure and independence of the board
of directors,117 and Commission rules have sought to divide board
decisionmaking into specialized functions that are delegated to
distinct board committees.118 For example, over the course of the past
several decades, the Commission has focused on the audit committee,
pushing issuers to create audit committees comprised of independent
directors while, at the same time, increasing the authority and
responsibility of these committees.119 The introduction of the QLCC is
consistent with this approach.
Although a complete comparison of the relative merits of the
approach embodied in Sarbanes-Oxley and the Commission’s
approach to corporate governance is beyond the scope of this Article,
one observation is clear: the Commission has shifted the focus of the
existing reform effort from gatekeepers to boards of directors. As we
next explain, by implanting the QLCC within its attorney conduct
rules and offering the committee as a means of reducing the burdens
116. See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director's Compliance Oversight
Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 44–45 (2001) (describing the
Commission’s review of its rules pertaining to corporate governance and its conclusions, all
focusing on board strength and director independence).
117. As the Commission explained in 1980, “[t]he board of directors has come to be viewed
by many as the center of efforts to enhance corporate accountability. With an increased number
of truly independent directors and an effectively functioning committee system, an
institutionalized process for holding management accountable will be created.” STAFF OF THE
SEC, REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 579 (Sept. 4, 1980).
118. See, e.g., Listed Company Audit Committee Release, supra note 65, at 87,402 (defining
the standards for directors to be considered “independent” for purposes of membership on
audit committees); Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 31,327,
[1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶85,056, at 83,414–31 (Oct. 16, 1992) (requiring
compensation committees of boards of directors to prepare reports disclosing the basis for the
compensation paid to executives (despite objections from commentators that disclosure is
inappropriate)); Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate
Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally; Final Rules, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 15,384, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶81,766, at 81,088–99 (Dec.
6, 1978) (amending the proxy rules to require greater disclosure of conflicts of interest,
composition of standing committees of boards of directors, director attendance at meetings, and
director resignations).
119. As with its initial efforts concerning audit committees, the Commission did not
mandate the use of QLCCs. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance
Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. REV. 325, 340–43 (2001) (describing the way the Commission
effectively pressured the New York Stock Exchange to impose audit committee requirements
through its listing standards). Rather, the Commission appears to be seeking to employ market
forces and to enlist attorneys as mediating agents in an effort to apply indirect pressure to
issuers to create QLCCs. The role of market forces in the implementation of QLCCs is
described infra in Part II.B.2.
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and the risks imposed by Rule 205 on reporting attorneys, the
Commission has also skewed the calculus faced by issuers in deciding
whether or not to create QLCCs.
B. The Factors Influencing Decisions To Create QLCCs
1. The Benefits and Costs of QLCCs. The benefits and costs of
creating a QLCC are, at this time, very speculative. The
Commission’s analysis of QLCCs focuses primarily on the advantages
that these committees may confer on issuers and investors. Indeed,
the Commission affirmatively “encourages issuers to [create QLCCs]
as a means of effective corporate governance.”120 In the Adopting
Release, the Commission explains that “the QLCC institutionalizes
the process of reviewing reported evidence of a possible material
violation,”121 characterizing this outcome as “a welcome development
in itself.”122 More specifically,
[t]he Commission believes that some issuers will choose to adopt
QLCCs, and that they may prove to be a recognized and effective
means of reviewing reported evidence of material violations.
Because a QLCC must consist of at least two independent directors
(as well as one member of the [issuer’s] audit committee), it will give
greater authority to independent directors. This should serve as an
important check on corporate management.123
The Commission also reasons that the creation of a QLCC will
provide a mechanism for independent directors to become involved
in the process of evaluating allegations of misconduct. The extent to
which these benefits will be realized depends critically on the viability
of the Commission’s preferred corporate governance model. In
particular, QLCCs raise the question of whether allocating the
responsibility for investigating and responding to reports of
120. Adopting Release, supra note 59, at 87,083.
121. Id. at 87,089.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 87,101. Significantly, for purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the
Commission estimates that 20% of issuers will create QLCCs. Id. The rationale for this estimate
is not clear. If the benefits of QLCCs outweigh the costs (as the Commission apparently
believes), then we would expect most issuers to create them. Pressure from attorneys will only
increase the number of issuers who create QLCCs. If, however, QLCCs impose substantial costs
on issuers that are not recognized by the Commission (or described in the Adopting Release),
then issuers will likely resist their creation.
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misconduct to a specialized committee of independent directors is an
effective way of addressing misconduct.
The Commission has also indicated that the mere existence of a
formalized and centralized mechanism will increase the likelihood
that issuers will work within themselves to resolve reported
occurrences of misconduct quickly.124 The technical details of the
structure of the board of directors and its committees are unlikely,
however, to dictate responsiveness. Rather, the extent to which
directors respond promptly and appropriately to indications of
misconduct is more likely to be a function of the issuer’s “corporate
culture” and the overall level of board involvement in corporate
decisionmaking. If the issuer or the board of directors is already
inclined to act forcefully, then the creation of a QLCC is unlikely to
enhance or to hinder the willingness or ability to respond to reports of
misconduct. If, on the other hand, the general approach is one of
passivity, then the creation of a QLCC is unlikely to address this
problem. The issuer’s decision to create a QLCC might arguably
modify its culture, serving to alter norms for reporting and
responding to evidence of misconduct, but the extent of likely
modification seems limited at best.
Finally, the Commission believes that QLCCs may help to
increase investor confidence as
investors will know that [an issuer] that forms a QLCC will have
reports of misconduct evaluated by at least one member of the [issuer’s]
audit committee as well as two or more of its independent directors.
Investors will also know that if an issuer fails to implement a
recommendation that the QLCC has recommended, the QLCC, after a
majority vote, may notify the Commission.125
In  light of the numerous scandals and widespread fraud involving
issuers that had audit committees comprised of independent
directors, it is highly debatable whether investors will be reassured by
the creation of yet another independent board committee.
124. Id. at 87,100–01.
125. Id. at 87,101.
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At the same time, the creation of a QLCC is likely to entail
substantial costs—costs that the Commission has not discussed.126
These costs include the costs of creating and maintaining the
committee and the costs associated with the impact of the committee
on the board of directors, including the functioning of the board of
directors and the relationship between the board of directors and
senior management.
The creation of a QLCC is likely to reduce an issuer’s ability to
attract qualified directors. Issuers have long expressed concern that,
as the burdens associated with being a director increase, their success
in attracting and retaining qualified directors decreases.127 The
creation of a QLCC clearly increases the burdens associated with
serving on a board of directors.128 In particular, serving on the QLCC
would require an extensive commitment of time and effort and would
likely increase the director’s exposure to liability and litigation.129 The
126. The Commission notes only that issuers who “choose to form a QLCC . . . will incur
costs. These costs might include increased compensation and insurance for QLCC members,
and the administrative costs to establish the committee.” Adopting Release, supra note 59, at
87,101.
127. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Domenici) (arguing that excessive securities fraud litigation hurts the ability of American
businesses to attract competent board directors); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani,
Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 489, 507 (2002) (noting that
decisions indicating a greater willingness by courts to find directors liable for breaches of
fiduciary duty “led to a widespread concern that companies might be unable to attract qualified
individuals to serve on their boards of directors”); Thomas Lee Hazen, Observation: Corporate
Directors’ Accountability: The Race to the Bottom—The Second Lap, 66 N.C. L. REV. 171, 179
(1987) (calling the “feared inability to attract good directors” due to difficulties in securing
insurance “a real concern”).
128. Indeed, commentators have argued that “the new rules may make it harder for [issuers]
to recruit effective board members.” Andrew Osterland, Board Games, CFO MAGAZINE, Nov.
1, 2002, at 34, 36.
129. As one commentator notes, the responsibilities of the QLCC “impose[] a personal
burden on . . . non-employee directors that goes far beyond anything that can reasonably be
requested of them.” Letter from Clifford Chance US LLP, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC
6 (Dec. 18, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). See Symposium, Lessons from Enron: A
Symposium on Corporate Governance, 54 MERCER L. REV. 731, 748 (2003) (inquiry of Michael
Rosenzweig) (“[W]hy would these independent, professional, capable individuals want to serve
on these boards when one remembers that in this new world of corporate responsibility, they’ve
got dramatically increased authority, dramatically increased responsibility . . . [and] significantly
increased exposure, therefore, to liability?”); Michael Schroeder, Cleaner Living, No Easy
Riches: Critics Say Sarbanes-Oxley Law Hobbles Stocks, Chills Risk Taking, but Upshot Is Far
Less Dramatic, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2003, at C1 (“Top executives have been wringing their
hands about Sarbanes-Oxley’s potential to create a shortage of candidates to fill board seats.”);
Letter from Clifford Chance, to Jonathan G. Katz, supra, at 6 (stating belief that issuers “will
have great difficulty in finding non-employee directors who will be willing to serve on QLCCs”).
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burden is multiplied in cases in which the issuer’s audit committee
also serves as the QLCC.130 Service on a QLCC will require directors
to design an appropriate reporting system, develop procedures for
investigating reports, and establish standards for evaluating the
results of those investigations and deciding on appropriate remedial
action. The burden associated with processing reports of misconduct
will be exacerbated to the extent that attorneys face incentives to
report all possible indications of misconduct to the QLCC.131 The
work of the committee is likely to involve difficult questions of law.
Members of the QLCC may lack familiarity with legal issues,
particularly if the QLCC is simply the audit committee, for which
directors are chosen for their financial rather than legal expertise.132
Finally, service on the committee may increase the liability exposure
of QLCC members relative to other members of the board of
directors.133
130. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 129, at 748 (inquiry of Michael Rosenzweig) (noting
that directors will be “spending lots more time, especially if you’re lucky enough to be on the
audit committee, or the compensation committee, or the nominating committee”); Schroeder,
supra note 129 (describing Sarbanes-Oxley as requiring “additional work, responsibilities and
obligations on the part of the outside auditor, management and the audit committee”) (quoting
William F. Ezzell, chairman of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants).
131. See Letter from Los Angeles County Bar Association to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
SEC 6 (Dec. 18, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“The low threshold requiring an
attorney to report ‘evidence of a material violation’ could easily create a large flow of
information to the chief legal officer or qualified legal compliance committee which could
[create an expensive and unwieldy process].”).
132. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms,
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 823
(2001) (“Most directors are not lawyers, and have little or no first-hand knowledge of legal
rules.”).
133. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 129, at 748 (inquiry of Michael Rosenzweig)
(identifying the likelihood that service on the audit, nominating, or compensation committee
means “bottom line, significantly increased exposure . . . to liability”).
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The costs of maintaining a QLCC will obviously vary according
to factors such as the size of the issuer, the nature of the issuer’s
business, and the composition of the board of directors. These costs
include the compensation that issuers must pay their committee
members. Given the increased obligations and liability exposure
faced by QLCC members, issuers may need to compensate QLCC
members more highly than other directors.134 Issuers may face higher
costs in obtaining directors and officers insurance, especially if QLCC
members are targeted in litigation more frequently, even if they do
not ultimately face greater liability exposure than other directors.135
Each issuer will also face opportunity costs, in that the work
associated with the QLCC will take away from the time independent
directors are able to devote to overseeing other aspects of the issuer’s
affairs.136 Independent directors, in particular, have limited time to
devote to their director’s duties. Even if serving on the QLCC causes
them to increase the number of hours they devote to the issuer’s
affairs, their responsibilities on the QLCC may reduce their ability to
provide other valuable services to the issuer, including strategic
planning and selecting and evaluating senior management.
134. See, e.g., id. at 752 (inquiry of Judge Benjamin F. Tennille) (“You get what you
incentivize, and the way you structure director compensation has got to be based on what you
want to give directors the incentive to do. If you want them to spend more time, you pay them
for the time they spend.”).
135. See, e.g., id. at 748 (inquiry of Michael Rosenzweig) (“[I]t’s increasingly difficult to
secure adequate directors and officers liability insurance coverage, and that once it is secured
those D&O companies increasingly deny coverage, or seek to deny coverage, when claims are
actually made.”); Theo J. Francis, It Still Costs Big to Insure Against a Boardroom Scandal:
Despite the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill, “D&O” Policy Prices Rise 30%, and Cancellation Clauses
Swell, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2003, at C1 (stating that:
a year after Congress legislated responsibilities for corporate boards and officers,
aiming to make corporate scandal less likely, rates for what is known as ‘directors and
officers’ liability insurance are still rising—albeit at a slower pace—and the terms of
the coverage remain stingier than just a few years back
and noting that “now, annual increases are more in the 25% to 30% range”); Letter from Sean
M. Fitzpatrick, Chief Underwriting Officer, Chubb Specialty Insurance, to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, SEC 3 (Dec. 17, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (stating that because
professional liability exposures such as those arising under Rule 205 “have traditionally been
viewed as outside the normal duties of a director or officer for purposes of D&O insurance,
there will be significant reluctance on the part of underwriters to include this type of risk in
D&O coverage absent substantial additional premium”).
136. See, e.g., Carol Hymowitz & Joan S. Lublin, Boardrooms Under Renovation: Scandals
Prompted Changes but Critics Say More Are Needed to Prevent Another Enron, WALL ST. J.,
July 22, 2003, at B1 (noting that directors “sometimes find themselves spending too much time
listening to advisers, rather than attending to the [issuer’s] business”).
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The creation of a QLCC will also affect relationships among
directors and between the board of directors and senior management.
State law has traditionally treated the board of directors as a collegial
body.137 Directors act collectively, and they have generally been held
to lack the authority to act for the issuer in their individual
capacities.138 Although boards of directors have the power to create
special committees and to delegate decisionmaking authority to those
committees,139 a distinction exists between a voluntary board decision
to create a committee, which may be modified or abolished at any
time, and a regulation that imposes “long term structural power-
related distinctions between different groups of directors of the same
board.”140
The QLCC is likely to disrupt the collective decisionmaking
structure of the collegial board. Because of their work on the
committee, members of the QLCC will have greater information and
perhaps be better compensated than the other directors. In effect, the
members of the QLCC will be specialist directors. Their specialist
status may interfere with their ability to participate in collective
decisionmaking. For example, their superior knowledge of the issuer’s
affairs and their devotion of greater time to the issuer’s operations
may lead them to demand deference from the other nonspecialist
directors. In addition, the nonspecialist directors may resent the
higher pay or greater access to information possessed by QLCC
members, and this resentment may lead them to be less involved in
the affairs of the issuer. In this way, the differences between members
of the QLCC and other directors may impair the ability of the board
of directors to function effectively.141
With respect to the relationship between the board of directors
and senior management, it is important to recognize that the
137. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45 (2002) (describing the board of directors as a “collegial
body that, for the most part, makes decisions by consensus”).
138. See, e.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 206 (8th ed. 2000) (“A single director, as such, has no power. Instead,
directors can act only as a body.”).
139. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (2001) (“The board of directors may, by
resolution passed by a majority of the whole board, designate 1 or more committees . . . .”); N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW § 712(a) (2003) (“[T]he board, by resolution adopted by a majority of the
entire board, may designate from among its members an executive committee . . . .”).
140. Carmody v. Toll Brothers, 723 A.2d 1180, 1192 (Del. Ch. 1998).
141. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 132, at 800 (arguing that differences among directors
“interfere[] with the board as a productive team in all its capacities”).
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creation of a QLCC will create a governance structure that functions
independently of management. The QLCC will receive reports of
misconduct, investigate the allegations contained in the reports, and
respond to those allegations without involving, or even consulting
with, management. Indeed, Rule 205 explicitly requires the QLCC
to establish procedures for maintaining the confidentiality of reports
that it receives,142 presumably as an attempt to insulate reporting
attorneys from management retaliation. As a result, management
may not even have knowledge of the work of the QLCC. Exclusion
of management, particularly the chief executive officer, from
important work of the issuer generally and the board of directors
specifically is wholly inconsistent with the normal operation of both
the issuer and the board of directors. Ironically, it is also
inconsistent with the requirement of Sarbanes-Oxley that the
issuer’s chief executive officer and chief financial officer
affirmatively certify their familiarity with the issuer’s internal
controls and any deficiencies in those controls.143
Management, particularly the chief executive officer, is thus
likely to resist the creation of a QLCC. If the issuer decides,
nonetheless, to establish a QLCC, management is likely to mistrust its
activities and fail to support investigations in which it is engaged,
particularly because management will not be fully informed of the
subject of the investigations. Similarly, a concern about the QLCC’s
investigative role and potentially antagonistic relationship with
management may lead management to share less information with the
board of directors as a whole.144 For example, the chief executive
officer may become reluctant to seek the advice of members of the
board of directors, particularly those serving on the QLCC, regarding
concerns related to the accounting methods used to record the
revenues of a new business. At the same time, management’s lack of
access to early warnings of potential problems within the issuer may
impair its ability to run the issuer’s business effectively. For example,
the chief executive officer may be preparing to promote an executive
while, at the same time, the QLCC is investigating that executive’s
role in alleged misconduct.
142. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(2) (2003).
143. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (West Supp. 2003).
144. See Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 281 (1997) (“A
board that maintains a greater distance may risk inadequately understanding the company it is
attempting to monitor.”).
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2. The Role of Attorneys. In analyzing the benefits and costs
associated with QLCCs, issuers are likely to rely heavily on the
Commission’s encouragement and their attorneys’ advice. Attorneys
play an increasingly important role in mediating ambiguous or
complex legal issues for their clients.145 The role of attorneys as
mediating agents with respect to an issuer’s decision to create a
QLCC is particularly problematic due to the advantages that QLCCs
provide to attorneys who represent issuers.
As Professor John Coates explains, the division of labor between
attorneys and corporate clients causes clients to rely on their
attorneys to evaluate the effect of choices in governance structures
and to implement those choices through the drafting of appropriate
legal documents.146 Professor Kim Krawiec has applied this analysis to
the specific issue of corporate compliance, finding that clients are
driven by their attorneys to adopt structural reforms such as written
codes of conduct and reporting procedures.147 Similarly, Professor
Coates demonstrates that attorneys are the motivating force in the
adoption of takeover defensive structures.148
Client reliance on attorneys as mediating agents can be
problematic. Attorneys may act out of self-interest or ignorance,
thereby failing to provide their clients with the best advice, an issue of
particular importance with respect to decisions regarding governance
structures that are based primarily on nonlegal considerations. For
example, Professor Krawiec warns that, in many cases, structural
reforms advocated by attorneys are of uncertain value in improving
compliance.149 Similarly, Professor Coates concludes that differences
in the sophistication of attorneys or practice norms, rather than
efficiency concerns, govern variations in corporate governance
structures.150 In addition, Professor Coates finds that attorneys
consistently make errors in implementing their choices regarding
145. See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers,
89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (2001) (finding “strong evidence” that attorneys determine key
governance terms in corporate contracts relating to the adoption of takeover defenses).
146. See id. at 1309–11 (describing division of labor between attorney and client with respect
to governance choices as “a classic agency relationship”).
147. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance: An Incomplete Contracts Governance
Theory, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 487, 500–03 (2003).
148. Coates, supra note 145, at 1304.
149. See Krawiec, supra note 147, at 510 (“[L]ittle evidence exists at all concerning the
effectiveness of internal compliance structures as a means to reduce socially harmful conduct.”).
150. Coates, supra note 145, at 1382.
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takeover defensive structures.151 This work shows both that attorneys
have substantial influence over the governance structures adopted by
their issuer clients and that there is a risk that this influence will not
lead to the adoption of the best structures.
Attorney-driven decisions on issuer creation of QLCCs engender
a particular risk that an issuer’s needs will be poorly served because
of the substantial benefits that QLCCs provide to reporting attorneys.
Specifically, the creation of a QLCC is likely to relieve the burden
and reduce the risk associated with the reporting requirements of
Rule 205. This relief is especially significant in the case of outside
attorneys retained by the issuer. These attorneys face less work,
uncertainty, and exposure to liability when reporting to a QLCC. For
a chief legal officer, the creation of a QLCC is also likely to relieve
the burden and reduce the risk associated with conducting an inquiry
into a report of misconduct. As a result, outside counsel, and perhaps
in-house counsel as well, may pressure issuers to create QLCCs. One
commentator has observed that attorneys “may even insist that their
corporate clients establish QLCCs.”152
Consider first the obligations of a reporting attorney. If an issuer
has an appropriately constituted QLCC in place, the attorney is able
to satisfy fully the reporting obligations under Rule 205 simply by
reporting to the QLCC. As a result, the reporting attorney is relieved
both of the obligation to determine whether or not the issuer has
responded appropriately to the report and, if the determination is
that the response is not appropriate, of the obligation to report the
matter up the ladder. Moreover, although the Commission has not
adopted final rules concerning the attorney’s obligation to withdraw
from representation of the issuer, under the current proposals, the
attorney’s obligation is not triggered if the attorney reports to a
QLCC.153 Because the reporting attorney need not exercise judgment
in evaluating the timeliness or appropriateness of the issuer’s
response and the attorney need not make any additional reports or
withdraw from representation, the attorney’s potential liability is
limited after reporting to a QLCC.
151. See id. at 1368–69 (describing a large number of “gaffes” in initial governance
structures).
152. Letter from Richard W. Painter, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 5 (Dec. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/rwpainter1.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
153. Proposing Release, supra note 58, at 86,541; Second Proposing Release, supra note 74,
at 87,115.
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In contrast, if an issuer does not have a QLCC in place, the
reporting attorney must not only report to the issuer’s chief legal
officer, but the reporting attorney must also be satisfied that the
issuer’s response to the report is received within a reasonable period
of time and is appropriate.154 In the event the reporting attorney does
not receive an appropriate response within a reasonable period of
time, the reporting attorney must report the matter to others within
the issuer.155 These requirements create additional work for the
attorney in monitoring the situation and expose the attorney to
liability in applying the new (and confusing)156 regulatory standard to
determine whether or not the issuer has responded appropriately.
The additional burden and risk associated with evaluating the
timeliness and appropriateness of an issuer’s response are likely to be
significant, especially in the case of outside counsel.157 Despite diligent
efforts, outside counsel will often lack both information regarding the
issuer’s affairs and knowledge of the issuer’s decisionmaking process.
As a result, outside counsel will face severe difficulties in applying the
standard—that is, in developing a reasonable belief that no
misconduct has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur, in
determining that the issuer has adopted appropriate remedial
measures, or in evaluating the work of an investigating attorney and
the issuer’s response to the investigating attorney’s recommendation.
Outside counsel will also face a conflict in that any disagreement with
the issuer about the scope of the response is likely to impair future
business relationships, if the initial report has not already destroyed
those relationships.158 Finally, in addition to liability for violations of
154. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3) (2003).
155. Id.
156. As one commentator notes, the definition of the term “appropriate response” is
“ambiguous and raises significant uncertainty.” Letter from Richard Hall, Partner, Cravath,
Swaine & Moore, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 4 (Dec. 18, 2002) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
157. The burden and risk may also be significant for in-house counsel. Although in-house
counsel is likely to possess better information regarding the issuer than outside counsel and to
be better able than outside counsel to monitor the issuer’s decisionmaking process, in-house
counsel will face an important conflict in that, despite the “whistleblower” protections included
in section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2003), any disagreement with
management regarding the issuer’s response is likely to impair counsel’s employment (or at
least promotion and discretionary pay). In-house counsel will also face the same risks of
securities liability and claims of malpractice as outside counsel.
158. See Fisch & Rosen, supra note 16, at 1127–28 (arguing that the reporting up
requirement will jeopardize counsel’s business relationship with the issuer).
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the securities laws, counsel faces the risk of malpractice claims.159 This
risk is magnified by the Commission’s characterization of Rule 205’s
reporting obligation as part of the duties owed to the issuer as
a client.160
Now consider the obligations of a chief legal officer. If an
appropriately constituted QLCC is in place, a chief legal officer may
refer any report of a material violation or a material breach to the
QLCC.161 Once a report is referred to the QLCC, the chief legal
officer is relieved of the obligation to conduct an investigation
concerning the reported misconduct.162 In contrast, if an issuer does
not have a QLCC in place, then the chief legal officer must conduct
the investigation and take all reasonable steps to cause the issuer to
adopt an appropriate response to the report.163 Most importantly,
referral to the QLCC relieves the chief legal officer of the risk of a
subsequent determination, with the benefit of hindsight, that the
reported misconduct was not investigated properly. In light of the
potential liability now facing Vinson & Elkins in connection with its
159. As one commentator notes, Rule 205 “will increase both the frequency and severity of
malpractice claims against attorneys, by creating a higher volume of regulatory enforcement
actions by the Commission and by creating the basis for more traditional malpractice claims.”
Letter from Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Chief Underwriting Officer, Chubb Specialty Insurance, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 3, supra note 135, at 2. Along with the increased malpractice
risk, counsel will also likely face increased costs of malpractice insurance. Indeed, because “the
vast majority of lawyers professional liability policies . . . exclude” coverage for disciplinary or
grievance proceedings, and further exclude from the definition of covered loss fines, sanctions,
costs, and penalties, law “firms will not have coverage for the costs of defending disciplinary
proceedings by the Commission under the [p]roposed [r]ule [or Rule 205], nor for any penalties
assessed in such proceedings. Such coverage would be available, if at all, only for a substantial
additional premium . . . .” Id. at 3.
160. Rule 205.3 provides that “[a]n attorney appearing and practicing before the
Commission in the representation of an issuer owes his or her professional and ethical duties to
the issuer as an organization.” 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (a). Although Rule 205.7 states that nothing in
the rule “is intended to, or does, create a private right of action against any attorney, law firm,
or issuer based upon compliance or noncompliance with its provisions,” Id.
§ 205.7, shareholders are presumably free to enforce the issuer’s rights against attorneys through
derivative litigation.
161. Id. § 205.3(c)(2).
162. Id.
163. Id. § 205.3(b)(2).
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investigation of reported wrongdoing at Enron,164 this risk is
not insubstantial.
For all attorneys, then, the creation of a QLCC is likely to reduce
the burdens and risks associated with the requirements of Rule 205.
In addition to recognizing these significant benefits, attorneys are also
likely to view the QLCC as a mechanism for facilitating their
traditional roles as advisors and “transaction cost engineers.”165 In
other words, the QLCC, by reducing attorneys’ obligations as
gatekeepers, will allow them to focus on providing legal advice and
structuring transactions. This effect is increased by the confidentiality
accorded to the QLCC’s investigations, which reduces the risk that an
attorney’s reports of corporate misconduct will result in dismissal
from representation and loss of business.166
Due to the fact that attorneys will retain the choice, with respect
to an issuer that has created a QLCC, between reporting evidence of
misconduct to the QLCC or to the issuer’s chief legal officer or chief
executive officer, the QLCC may also provide attorneys with
additional leverage. An attorney may approach the chief legal officer,
for example, and threaten to report evidence of misconduct to the
QLCC unless the attorney receives assurances of retention in future
matters. An in-house attorney, or even the chief legal officer, could
use a similar threat to secure job protection from the chief executive
officer. Because management reasonably needs and wants to be
informed of potential misconduct and to be involved in the
investigation of the allegations (rather than leaving the investigation
to independent directors), management is likely to be responsive to
these threats.
Consequently, attorneys may pressure their issuer clients and
potential clients to create QLCCs. Issuers that refuse to establish
QLCCs may find themselves disadvantaged in the market for legal
services. Attorneys, especially those at elite law firms, may refuse
164. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Many Strands: Another Inquiry; Company Hobbled
Investigation by Its Law Firm, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at A19. (quoting the
Powers’ Report conclusion that Vinson & Elkins’ investigation was “inadequate” and that its
findings were “largely predetermined by the scope and nature of the investigation and the
process employed”).
165. For a discussion of this role of attorneys, see Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by
Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
166. See Fisch & Rosen, supra note 16, at 1125–26 (identifying the potential adverse
professional consequences faced by lawyers who report up in accordance with the requirements
of Sarbanes-Oxley section 307).
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engagements with issuers who do not have QLCCs. Indeed, one
plausible rationale for the regulatory structure adopted in Rule 205 is
to provide market-based incentives for issuers to create QLCCs.167
Importantly, however, attorney pressure on issuers to establish
QLCCs may reflect the benefits to attorneys from the creation of
QLCCs, rather than the benefits to issuers.
Finally, even if QLCCs are a desirable governance practice for
issuers, they may impose costs on the capital markets. Historically,
issuers have been able to signal to investors the quality of their
management, the monitoring provided by their board of directors,
and their internal controls, by adopting “high quality” governance
structures such as independent boards of directors and active audit
committees.168 To the extent that the Commission mandates specific
governance structures, directly or indirectly, it reduces the ability of
issuers to signal high quality by voluntarily choosing these structures.
Any reduction in the ability of issuers to signal their quality to
investors reduces the transparency of the capital markets, and any
reduction in transparency reduces the ability of the capital markets to
price securities accurately.169
167. As one group of commentators notes:
[M]any public companies are likely to adopt the QLCC procedure for reporting evi-
dence of material violations because the use of this procedure satisfies the report ob-
ligation of a reporting attorney, relieves that attorney of the duty to effect a “noisy
withdrawal,” and relieves the [chief legal officer] of the duty to conduct his own in-
quiry.
Letter from Susan P. Koniak and Other Law Professors, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 11
(Dec. 17, 2002) (on file with Duke Law Journal). In addition, these commentators note “the
practical reality that many or most large public companies will adopt the alternative reporting
procedures provided in § 205.3(c).” Id. at 21.
168. For example, Professor John Coffee has recently pointed out that foreign issuers may
list their securities on U.S. securities exchanges as a means of subjecting themselves to the
higher disclosure standards, and greater threat of enforcement, of the U.S. markets and of
credibly signaling their intention to make fuller disclosure, thereby achieving a higher market
valuation and a lower cost of capital. John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact
of Cross-Listing and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1797 (2002). Similarly, issuers may adopt high quality governance
structures as a means of credibly signaling their intention to provide effective controls on
management.
169. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 342–43 (6th ed. 2002)
(describing the role of efficient capital markets in incorporating information into the prices
of stocks).
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This analysis does not mean that the costs of QLCCs necessarily
outweigh the benefits. The potential effectiveness of QLCCs in
addressing misconduct is unproven.  Ultimately the Commission’s
predictions about the value of QLCCs may be borne out. In the
absence of experience with QLCCs, the calculus is highly uncertain.
We simply observe here that the Commission has not discussed in any
detail the costs of QLCCs and that the benefits of QLCCs for
attorneys are likely to increase pressure on issuers to adopt QLCCs,
independent of the issuer’s own calculation of the benefits and costs.
From the issuer’s (and the public’s) perspective, the key question
is whether QLCCs are likely to be successful in preventing, or at least
limiting, corporate misconduct. Although the absence of experience
with QLCCs makes it impossible to answer this question directly,
some insight may be drawn from the audit committee experience.
Compelling analogies exist between the QLCC and the audit
committee. Accordingly, we next turn our attention to the experience
with audit committees.
C. Lessons from Audit Committees
The Commission has a long history of implementing its vision of
corporate governance reform. This vision, which focuses on
monitoring by independent directors, relies on revisions to the
structure of the board of directors and the adoption of specialized
board committees. As with recent initiatives regarding QLCCs, the
Commission’s actions regarding audit committees over the course of
the past sixty years reflect an attempt to divide board decisionmaking
into separate functions that are delegated to distinct committees
comprised of specialist directors. In many ways, QLCCs resemble
audit committees, particularly in their composition and their intended
role in enhancing the monitoring role of the board of directors.
Consequently, the historical experience with audit committees is
instructive in predicting the likely effectiveness of QLCCs.
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1. The Experience with Audit Committees. The Commission first
identified the use of audit committees as a valuable regulatory
objective in the 1940s.170 Subsequently, in connection with its
examination of corporate governance practices in the 1970s, the
Commission focused specifically on audit committees. The
Commission did not initially attempt to mandate the use of audit
committees, presumably taking the view that such an attempt would
have been inconsistent with the traditional division between state and
federal regulatory authority.171 Instead, the Commission used its
supervisory power over self-regulatory organizations, including the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (NYSE) and the Nasdaq Stock
Market, Inc., (Nasdaq), to encourage them to impose audit committee
requirements.172 The NYSE and the Nasdaq responded to
Commission pressure by recommending and ultimately requiring,
through their listing standards, that issuers establish independent
audit committees.173
Thus, in 1972, the Commission issued a release endorsing “the
establishment by all publicly-held companies of audit committees
composed of outside directors.”174 The NYSE responded by
recommending that listed companies create audit committees
comprised of outside directors.175 In 1974, the Commission amended
its proxy disclosure rules to require issuers to disclose the presence or
170. Listed Company Audit Committee Release, supra note 65, at 87,404, n.17; see also
Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 534, 545 (1984) (describing the history of the Commission’s effort to implement
independent audit committees); Helen S. Scott, The SEC, the Audit Committee Rules, and the
Marketplaces: Corporate Governance and the Future, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 549, 551 (2001) (“Since
the early 1940s, the Commission, along with the auditing and corporate communities, has had a
continuing interest in promoting effective and independent audit committees.”) (citing Audit
Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 41,987, [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,209, at 82,409 (Oct. 7, 1999) [hereinafter Audit Committee Disclosure
Release].
171. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (striking down one
share/one vote rule as beyond the Commission’s authority).
172. Karmel, supra note 119, at 340; Scott, supra note 170, at 554.
173. Scott, supra note 170, at 554.
174. Standing Audit Committees Composed of Outside Directors, Exchange Act Release
No. 9,548, [1971–1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,670, at 81,424 (Mar. 23,
1972).
175. Karmel, supra note 119, at 329 (attributing the evolution of the NYSE’s independence
requirement for audit committee members to pressure from the Commission).
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absence of audit committees.176 The NYSE responded in 1977,
amending its rules to mandate that all listed domestic companies
create and maintain “audit committee[s] comprised solely of directors
independent of management and free from any relationship that . . .
would interfere with [their] exercise of independent judgment.”177
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Commission’s focus on
accounting and financial controls increased, aided by various
statutory developments endorsing the Commission’s policy
perspective.178
The focus on audit committees has continued. In 1998, in
response to Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt’s public complaints
about audit committee composition and independence,179 the NYSE
and the Nasdaq tightened their respective listing standards, requiring
audit committees to consist of at least three members, each of whom
is independent and financially literate, with at least one member
having accounting or financial expertise.180 In addition, the rules
require each audit committee to have the right to hire and to fire the
176. Notice of Amendments to Require Increased Disclosure of Relationships Between
Registrants and Their Independent Public Accountants, Exchange Act Release No. 11,147,
[Accounting Series Release Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,187, at 62,394 (Dec.
20, 1974).
177. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 1977 SEC LEXIS
2252, at *1 (March 9, 1977).
178. See John F. Olson, How to Really Make Audit Committees More Effective, 54 BUS.
LAW. 1097, 1097–98 (1999) (tracing statutory developments from the enactment of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), to federal banking legislation requiring independent audit
committees for large financial institutions, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 § 112, 12 U.S.C. § 1831m(g)(1)(A), (j)(1) (2000)).
179. Arthur Levitt, The “Numbers Game,” Remarks at the New York University Center for
Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/
spch220.txt (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also Scott, supra note 170, at 552–57
(describing the role of the Commission, and Chairman Levitt, in providing the impetus for the
adoption of new listing standards by the NYSE and Nasdaq).
180. Self-Regulating Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 42,233, 1999 SEC LEXIS 2645, at *6–7
(Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter NYSE Release]; Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 42,231, 1999 SEC LEXIS 2655, at *8–9 (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Nasdaq
Release].
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issuer’s auditor.181 At the same time, the Commission revised the rules
mandating disclosure of audit committee activities.182
The following year, the Commission adopted more stringent
disclosure requirements that, in effect, dictate the structure and
operation of audit committees by requiring issuers to disclose the
extent to which the operation of their audit committees meets the
regulatory standards.183 Most recently, the Commission, as mandated
by section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley,184 directed the NYSE and the
Nasdaq (together with the other national securities exchanges and
associations) to adopt rules prohibiting the listing of any security of
any issuer that is not in compliance with specified requirements
relating to the independence, authority, responsibility, functioning,
and funding of expenses of audit committees.185
2. The Audit Committee Analogy. As this brief history of the
audit committee demonstrates, audit committees and QLCCs share
many similarities even with respect to the Commission’s role in their
adoption. The Commission identified the audit committee as a
desirable governance structure and subsequently enlisted the self-
regulatory organizations to encourage issuers to create audit
committees. By the same token, Rule 205 describes the Commission’s
position concerning the benefits of the QLCC and seeks to induce
issuers to create QLCCs voluntarily.
Moreover, QLCCs and audit committees reflect similar types of
governance structures. Both are independent board committees
comprised of specialist directors, that is, independent directors who,
181. NYSE Release, supra note 180, at *5; Nasdaq Release, supra note 180, at *8. See also
Listed Company Audit Committee Release, supra note 65, at 87,405 (noting revision of listing
standards related to audit committees by NYSE and Nasdaq); Scott, supra note 170, at 557–66
(describing adoption of rules by NYSE and Nasdaq).
182. See Audit Committee Disclosure Release, supra note 170, at 82,884 (adopting
disclosure requirements). See also Listed Company Audit Committee Release, supra note 65, at
87,405–06 (noting adoption of new rules by the Commission requiring disclosure of the function,
governance, and independence of audit committees).
183. See Audit Committee Disclosure Release, supra note 170, at 82,885 (requiring, inter
alia, each audit committee to “disclose” whether it has followed various procedures in
connection with the preparation of the issuer’s financial statements, and each issuer to
“disclose” whether its audit committee has a written charter and whether the members of its
audit committee are independent directors).
184. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. 78j-l (West Supp. 2003).
185. See Listed Company Audit Committee Release, supra note 65, at 87,402 (implementing
the requirements of section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l, as
amended by § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. 78j-l).
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through their work on the relevant committee, are expected to
develop expertise in the matters that come before the committee.
Both audit committees and QLCCs,186 unlike the types of special
committees that have developed under state corporate law to respond
to a specific transaction or event,187 are intended to divide the board’s
responsibilities by a permanent partitioning of the board of directors.
Both focus the compliance functions of the board of directors within a
subset of the directors. Finally, both audit committees and QLCCs
are empowered to retain their own professional advisors and to make
decisions on behalf of issuers without the acquiescence of either the
full board of directors or management.188
Concededly, the analogy between audit committees and QLCCs
is imperfect. In particular, the audit committee is designed to conduct
regularized activities in conjunction with management. The regular
nature of the committee’s work is likely to lead the committee, over
time, to develop knowledge of the issuer that increases the
committee’s effectiveness. This knowledge may be increased by
management’s participation in audit committee functioning. In
addition, members of the audit committee are required to have
financial expertise—a type of specialization that facilitates the
committee’s role in overseeing the issuer’s financial reporting.
186. To some extent, these observations may also apply to compensation and nominating
committees. Pending regulatory reforms are likely to increase the role and responsibilities of
compensation and nominating committees and to bring those committees further in line with
the analysis of audit committees contained in this Article. See, e.g., Disclosure Regarding
Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between Security Holders and Boards
of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 48,301, 68 Fed. Reg. 48,724 (Aug. 14, 2003) (proposing
new disclosure requirements aimed at increasing transparency of nominating committee
processes); Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate
Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 47,672, 68 Fed. Reg. 19,051, 19,054 (Apr. 17, 2003)
(proposing rules requiring listed companies to have nominating and compensation committees
comprised entirely of independent directors).
187. Issuers have increasingly used special board committees in connection with a specific
transaction to remove the taint of conflicts of interest. These temporary committees may, for
example, be used in negotiating management buyouts, in reviewing shareholder derivative
litigation, and in approving conflict of interest transactions. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Del. 1994) (describing the use of an
independent committee to negotiate the proposed transaction between the issuer and its
controlling shareholder); Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice Int’l Holdings, Inc., No. 13,950, 1997
Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, at *26–41 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1997) (describing role of special litigation
committee in negotiating settlement of shareholder derivative litigation).
188. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(3)(ii)(C) (2003) (requiring that the QLCC have the authority
to retain the expert personnel the committee deems necessary).
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In contrast, the QLCC’s work in responding to reports of
misconduct is likely to occur on an episodic basis. Specific reports of
misconduct need not be related to each other, and may not, over
time, increase the effectiveness of the committee. Moreover,
management is explicitly excluded from the work of the QLCC. Thus,
unlike the audit committee, the QLCC cannot be used to channel
information from management and the auditors to the full board of
directors. Finally, Rule 205 does not require members of the QLCC
to possess any specific qualifications, although legal training, in
particular, might facilitate the QLCC’s ability to evaluate the
likelihood of misconduct and to identify an appropriate response.
To the extent that these differences are significant, they suggest
that any lessons from the audit committee experience be evaluated
cautiously. In particular, they might suggest that QLCCs will be less
effective than audit committees. Nonetheless, the similarities between
audit committees and QLCCs, and the absence of any direct
experience with QLCCs, suggest that audit committees can provide
useful information for predicting the performance of QLCCs. As we
next show, empirical evidence regarding the audit committee
experience provides some support for the premise that specialist
board committees can improve issuer monitoring. Nevertheless, the
audit committee experience also identifies a key limitation in the
Commission’s approach—its failure to provide adequate incentives
for active and informed director involvement in corporate
decisionmaking.
3. The Effectiveness of Audit Committees. The Commission’s
initiatives regarding audit committees have drawn mixed reviews.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the audit committee requirements
elevate form over substance and do little to increase the effectiveness
of the board of directors. Audit committee members often remain
beholden to the chief executive officer, making them reluctant to
challenge the executive’s authority. As long ago as 1977, Commission
Chairman Roderick Hills noted that, while members of a board of
directors or audit committee may satisfy objective criteria regarding
independence from management, in many instances the election of
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these directors to the board and the committee is influenced by the
chief executive officer of the issuer.189
More recently, comments by both audit committee members and
chief executive officers reflect doubt concerning the true
independence of even nominally independent directors. For example,
Robert Jaedicke, the chairman of the audit committee at Enron,
described his role on the committee as “[t]o support management.”190
And, following the collapse of Waste Management, the new chairman
remarked that, as a general matter, chief executive officers are too
often successful in their efforts to ensure that members of audit
committees are “willing to go along with the flow—and not rock the
boat.”191
A fundamental premise of the Commission’s governance model,
with its focus on board and committee independence, is that
independent directors will be active and effective monitors.192 Even if
directors are truly independent of management, questions remain
concerning the effectiveness of the monitoring model of the board of
189. See Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After
Enron, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 449, 494 (2002) (describing the history of concerns regarding audit
committee effectiveness). For a review of the psychological underpinnings of directors’ lack of
actual independence from management, see James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Fall/Winter 1985). See also Fisch, supra note 144, at 270 (“Many non-
employee directors have substantial professional or personal ties to the [issuer] or its [chief
executive officer]. These ties may interfere with a director’s ability to monitor aggressively due
to fears of retaliation by the [chief executive officer].” (footnote omitted)).
190. Marie Brenner, The Enron Wars, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2002, available at
http://mariebrenner.com/articles/enron/en4.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
191. Joann S. Lublin & Elizabeth MacDonald, Management: Scandals Signal Laxity of Audit
Panels, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1998, at B1.
192. See Listed Company Audit Committee Release, supra note 65, at 87,407–14 (adopting
heightened standards of independence for members of audit committees).
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directors.193 The monitoring model may sacrifice other components of
board value.194 Independence, moreover, is not an unqualified benefit.
Although independent directors may lack disabling conflicts of
interest, they may also lack sufficient focus and involvement
regarding the affairs of the issuers they serve.195
The mix of advantages and disadvantages associated with
independent directors may explain the ambiguous empirical evidence
regarding their effectiveness. Empirical studies have failed to find
convincing evidence that greater board independence leads to
improved corporate performance.196 Although some studies have
demonstrated a relationship between board independence and
monitoring, they have failed to demonstrate a link between
193. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 144, at 268–75 (describing the support for the model of the
monitoring board and contrasting the model with that of the managing board); Gregory S.
Rowland, Earnings Management, the SEC, and Corporate Governance: Director Liability
Arising from the Audit Committee Report, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 186 (2002) (noting “the
growing implementation of the monitoring board in practice and statute, and the increasing
emphasis the courts and the [Commission] place on the concept”). Only independent directors,
of course, may reasonably be expected to perform effective monitoring functions, as directors
who are not independent from management are, by definition, members of management (or
very closely associated with management). See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1,
11 (2002) (“Independent directors who do not work full-time for the corporation . . .
theoretically are in a position to watch over [management].”).
194. See Langevoort, supra note 132, at 800 (“Too much true independence in the
boardroom has unintended consequences: By reducing the level of trust that comes from closer
or less adversarial relationships, it chills communication, leads to a variety of influence activities
by insiders, and produces more complicated (and less useful) agendas and debates.”); see also
Fisch, supra note 144, at 272 (“Board function need not be viewed solely in terms of monitoring
management.”).
195. As Professor Bill Bratton observes, “the degree of attention and quality of judgment
actually brought to bear” on any matter by independent (or any other) directors can not be
mandated. William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders and
Other Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1334
(2002).
196. See Fisch, supra note 144, at 277 (“[S]tudies have failed to establish an empirical link
between board independence and profitability.”); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S.
Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the
Economic Literature, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 7, 12 (“Overall,
there is little to suggest that board composition has any cross-sectional relationship to firm
performance.” (footnote omitted)). But see Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as
a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 922 (1996)
(“Four studies have found some evidence indicating a positive relation between presence of
outside directors and financial performance of the firm.”).
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monitoring and performance.197 Indeed, the first large-sample, long-
horizon study of the impact of board independence on issuer
performance, conducted by Professors Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard
Black, concludes that more independence does not result in better
performance.198 Furthermore, earlier work of Professors Bhagat and
Black suggests “the opposite—that [issuers] with supermajority-
independent boards perform worse than other [issuers], and that
[issuers] with more inside than independent directors perform about
as well as [issuers] with majority (but not supermajority) independent
boards.”199
Empirical studies, of course, have significant limitations. As
Professors Bhagat and Black and other researchers studying the
impact of board independence on performance recognize, it is
difficult to measure the extent to which directors are actually
independent from the management of the companies they serve.200
Professor Donald Langevoort cogently describes the difficulty in this
way:
“Independence” is a subjective concept that connotes a willingness
to bring a high degree of rigor and skeptical objectivity to the
evaluation of company management and its plans and proposals.
However, these studies have to use rough proxies for independence;
the simple absence of a job with the company, a lack of a close
family connection, or (perhaps) the absence of a regular stream of
income from the company apart from directors’ fees and dividends
are all that it takes to qualify. Under these restrictive definitions,
many directors who lack any real desire to take their monitoring
role seriously—who are on the board for reasons of status-seeking,
197. See, e.g., Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of
Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443, 445 (1996) (showing
that issuers with more independent boards experience fewer instances of financial statement
fraud); Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 FIN. ECON. 431, 457
(1988) (citing study results “consistent with the hypothesis that outside boards improve firm
value by replacing bad management” more often than inside boards).
198. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard S. Black, The Non-Correlation between Board Independence
and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 IOWA J. CORP. L. 231, 248–60 (2002).
199. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard S. Black, The Uncertain Relationship between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 921–22 (1999).
200. Bhagat & Black, supra note 198, at 266–67.
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sociability, or the perquisites that come with board membership—
fall into the “independent” category, thereby muddying the data.201
In addition, corporate performance is a function of many factors,
creating challenges for researchers seeking to measure the
relationship between any single factor and performance.202
Despite these challenges, empirical studies focused specifically
on audit committees may provide some guidance in assessing the
potential value of the QLCC. On this issue, the empirical evidence is
at odds with recent anecdotal evidence of audit committee failures. In
particular, studies have demonstrated a correlation between audit
committee independence and improved audit committee
functioning.203 For example, researchers have found that: (1) the
independence of audit committees “is positively related to the
informativeness of accounting data in valuation” exercises;204 (2)
issuers that demand greater certification from their auditors are most
likely to have completely independent (and active) audit
committees;205 (3) audit committees comprised of more independent
directors (and with greater governance expertise and lower
shareholdings) “are more effective in shielding auditors from
dismissal” following the issuance of a “going-concern” report;206 (4)
audit committees comprised of independent directors with greater
experience and greater audit knowledge are associated with greater
support for auditors who advocate a “substance over form” approach
201. Langevoort, supra note 132, at 798–99 (footnotes omitted); see also Fisch, supra note
144, at 279 (“Defining independence appropriately for purposes of these studies is particularly
difficult.”).
202. See Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 196, at 12 (discussing problems in measuring the
relationship).
203. But see Andrew J. Felo et al., Audit Committee Characteristics and the Perceived
Quality of Financial Reporting: An Empirical Analysis 25 (June 24, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (finding evidence that audit committee
independence is not related to financial statement quality).
204. April Klein, Causes and Consequences of Variations in Audit Committee Composition
27 (New York Univ. Ctr. for Law & Bus., Working Paper No. CLB-00-002, 2000), available at
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/clb/00-002.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
205. Dan N. Deli & Stuart L. Gillan, On the Demand for Independent and Active Audit
Committees, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 427, 428 (2000).
206. Joseph V. Carcello & Terry L. Neal, Audit Committee Characteristics and Auditor
Dismissals Following “New” Going-Concern Reports, ACCT. REV., Jan. 2003, at 95, 95.
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in disputes with management;207 and (5) audit committee members
who are managers of other issuers (and so are independent and well-
versed in current accounting and reporting standards) are more likely
to support auditors in disputes with management than are audit
committee members who are retired managers or who are individuals
without significant business experience.208 These findings lend some of
the strongest support to the Commission’s approach to corporate
governance in general, and to the Commission’s audit committee
initiatives in particular.
The most substantial limitation of these studies is their failure to
demonstrate a relationship between audit committee independence
and the accuracy of an issuer’s financial reporting. Recall that the
dominant corporate governance problem triggering the adoption of
Sarbanes-Oxley was the inaccuracy of publicly reported accounting
information. Empirical work addressing this question is more limited
and less convincing.
In a recent study, Professor April Klein considered the
relationship between audit committee independence and earnings
management, and she found a negative (nonlinear) relationship
between audit committee independence and earnings manipulation.209
Importantly, however, Professor Klein found a significant
relationship only in circumstances in which less than a majority of the
committee members were independent directors.210 For restatements
of financial statements, although one recent study found a significant
and negative association between the independence of audit
committee members and the occurrence of financial reporting
207. F. Todd DeZoort & Steven E. Salterio, The Effects of Corporate Governance
Experience and Financial Reporting and Audit Knowledge on Audit Committee Members’
Judgments, 20 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 31, 43 (2001).
208. Michael C. Knapp, An Empirical Study of Audit Committee Support for Auditors
Involved in Technical Disputes with Client Management, 62 ACCT. REV. 578, 579–80 (1987).
209. Professor Klein examined the relation between the proportion of independent directors
on an audit committee and abnormal accruals, which are considered proxies for earnings
management. April Klein, Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings
Management, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 375, 376–77 (2002).  In studying only current accruals (on
the theory that current accruals may more easily be manipulated by management than long-
term accruals), several researchers found no relation between (current) accruals and the
proportion of independent directors on the audit committees of the issuers in their sample.
Biao Xie et al., Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: The Role of the Board and
the Audit Committee, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 295, 307 (2003).
210. Klein, supra note 209, at 376–77.
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restatements,211 another found a negative relationship between the
characteristics of audit committee members and the probability of a
restatement of earnings only when audit committee members were
not only independent, but also financial experts.212 In analyzing the
impact of independent directors and financial experts on earnings
restatements, the use of multiple regression analysis revealed that the
presence on an audit committee of an independent director with
financial expertise is negatively correlated with restatements and
significant, indicating that the selection of one director with financial
expertise may offer more protection against restatements than an
audit committee comprised of only independent directors. 213
These results, too, have their limitations. As is the case with
studies of the effectiveness of board independence, it is difficult to
measure the independence of audit committee members accurately.
More problematically, to the extent the studies involve periods in
which the use of audit committees was not mandatory, the
relationship between audit committee independence and audit
committee effectiveness may be spurious. Issuers that are well run,
and so have a limited need for monitoring on the part of audit
committees, may create independent audit committees simply
because they are well run. These issuers may also create independent
audit committees as a means of signaling to investors and the capital
markets their quality. In either case, evidence of a positive
relationship between audit committee independence and audit
committee effectiveness may not indicate a causal relationship
between audit committee independence and effectiveness.214 At the
211. Lawrence J. Abbott et al., Audit Committee Characteristics and Financial
Misstatement: A Study of the Efficacy of Certain Blue Ribbon Committee Recommendations 3
(Sept. 24, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
212. Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals 19
(July 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).  Professors Agrawal
and Chadha note that, for all issuers in their sample (those that did restate earnings and those
that did not), the proportion of independent directors on the audit committees was, on average,
the same: approximately 71%.  Id. at 16.
213. Id. at 19–20.
214. Professors Agrawal and Chadha seek to test whether issuers that are well run are more
likely than other issuers to appoint independent directors with financial expertise to their
boards of directors.  They examine whether or not operating performance varies across the
issuers in their sample, dividing the sample into those issuers that restate earnings and those that
do not restate earnings.  Professors Agrawal and Chadha find that performance is not
significantly related to the presence of independent directors with financial expertise, and they
conclude that the presence of these directors leads to an absence of restatements.  Id. at 22–23.
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end of the day, the existing empirical research provides, at best,
limited support for the Commission’s approach.
More importantly, precisely because the empirical studies do not
measure the relationship between regulatory changes and audit
committee functioning, they cannot capture the effectiveness of the
rule-based approach. The studies do not answer the question of
whether mandated reforms to board structure or composition address
underlying problems of director passivity or cronyism.
Notably, the limitations of the rule-based approach are reflected
in the recent events at Enron. During the time when Enron was
engaged in massive financial and reporting fraud, Enron’s board of
directors and audit committee were comprised of a majority of
directors who were (at least nominally) independent from Enron’s
officers.215 As one commentator observed, “Enron had a fully
functional audit committee operating under the [Commission]’s
expanded rules on audit committee disclosure.”216 In terms of
structure, if not performance, Enron’s audit committee met or
exceeded existing corporate governance standards such as those of
the Blue Ribbon Panel.217 Indeed, Enron’s audit committee was
chaired by Robert K. Jaedicke, dean and a professor of accounting at
Stanford University School of Business.218
Many commentators have rightly questioned whether or not the
members of Enron’s board of directors and audit committee were
215. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An
Examination of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357, 359,
364 (2003) (describing Enron’s audit committee as consisting of “six independent directors, two
of whom had formal accounting training and experience, and only one who was less than
expert”).
216. Ribstein, supra note 193, at 26.
217. See generally Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/blueribb.pdf (Feb. 8, 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(setting forth recommendations aimed at increasing the independence, effectiveness, and
accountability of audit committees).
218. Douglas M. Branson, Enron—When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap
to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989, 1016 (2003).
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actually independent from management.219 It is likely, however, that
the difficulties with the board of directors and the audit committee
stemmed not from structural problems but rather from the directors’
failure to remain informed and to oversee closely the transactions in
which management engaged.220 As Professor Janis Sarra has observed,
although all but two of Enron’s fifteen directors “were ostensibly
independent,” the “board culture . . . was unquestioning” and so did
not “provide for healthy scrutiny and monitoring of the corporate
officers.”221 This leads Professor Sarra to conclude that the presence
of “‘independent directors’ is in itself insufficient guarantee of
independent oversight.”222 Professor Sarra further notes that “[t]he
Powers Report [prepared by the Special Investigative Committee of
the Board of Directors of Enron] also found that the [a]udit
[c]ommittee . . . consisted of independent directors, but that they
failed to investigate or give serious consideration to the related party
transactions.”223
A final question remains: is the Commission’s rule-based
approach to the board of directors and its functions likely to lead to
effective monitoring of corporate decisionmaking? The experience
with audit committees offers reasons to question the value of
corporate governance structures, such as specialized board
committees, unless these structures provide adequate incentives for
active and informed decisionmaking. As Bill Lerach has observed, “in
truth, audit committees have provided little protection against
219. See, e.g., Fisch & Rosen, supra note 16, at 1120–21 (citing to various authorities
identifying conflicts, biases, and relationships that potentially compromised the judgment of the
Enron directors); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1241–42 (2002)
(“[T]he independence of virtually every board member, including [a]udit [c]ommittee members,
was undermined by side payments of one kind or another. Independence also was compromised
by the bonds of long service and familiarity.” (footnote omitted)); Joanne S. Lublin, Inside,
Outside Enron, Audit Committee Is Scrutinized, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, at C1 (identifying
audit committee conflicts of interest).
220. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 195, at 1334 (warning that a structural approach to good
governance may result in boards of directors that simply go through the motions because the
approach “cannot make the further subjective inquiry into the degree of attention and quality of
judgment actually brought to bear”).
221. Janis Sarra, Rose-Colored Glasses, Opaque Financial Reporting, and Investor Blues:
Enron as Con and the Vulnerability of Canadian Corporate Law, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 715, 728
(2002).
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing Powers et al., supra note 1).
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financial manipulation.”224 The Wall Street Journal has described audit
committees as “toothless tigers.”225 Accordingly, in Part III, we
consider several alternative ways to increase the incentives for
directors to monitor management decisions.
III.  CREATING INCENTIVES FOR DIRECTOR ACTIVISM
Part II highlights the shortcomings of the Commission’s
approach to corporate governance reform. Most problematically,
recent corporate governance scandals have revealed a troubling
degree of director passivity.226 As Ira Millstein recently observed, “in
many of the recent highly public corporate governance failures, a
more active, engaged, and informed board of directors might have
uncovered, prevented, or at least mitigated the crisis that caused
many of these companies to collapse.”227
The Commission’s proposed solution, a rule-based approach to
board structure with increased emphasis on specialized board
committees comprised of independent directors, is unlikely to address
the problem of director passivity.228 Importantly, directors continue to
face a conflict between maintaining their loyalty to management and
challenging management’s decisions.229 Directors continue to be
224. William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken for
Trillions by Corporate Insiders—The Rise of the New Corporate Kleptocracy, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 69, 106 (2002).
225. Lublin & MacDonald, supra note 191.
226. See, e.g., Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U.
CINN. L. REV. 1233, 1234–35 (describing director passivity at Enron); Sarra, supra note 221, at
728 (same); Floyd Norris, Ebbers and Passive Board Blamed for Worldcom Woes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 2003, at C1 (describing two reports finding director passivity at Worldcom); Ira
Millstein, A Self-Correcting Course for Governance, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 2003, at 26,
27 (observing that director passivity appears to have been “more prevalent than many
believed”).
227. Millstein, supra note 226, at 27.
228. One might argue that the creation of a QLCC could be valuable by modifying the
norms applicable to director conduct, even in the absence of an increased liability risk or direct
financial incentives to motivate QLCC members. Although the “norms” literature has become
increasingly important in corporate law, see, e.g., Symposium, Norms and Corporate Law, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001) (debating the role of norms in various corporate law contexts), we
argue that structural requirements such as greater director independence and the establishment
of more board committees have not had the effect of modifying the “norm” of director passivity
and are unlikely to do so. See Millstein, supra note 226, at 27–28 (recognizing the need for
further regulatory changes to increase meaningful levels of director oversight).
229. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, The Millennium Bubble and Its Aftermath: Reforming
Corporate America and Getting Back to Business, M&A LAWYER, July–Aug. 2003, at 1, 1
(observing that “‘independent’ directors often were independent in name but not in spirit”).
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limited in the time and expertise that they are able to bring to
monitoring management.230 Most importantly, directors continue to
rely on the combination of superficial compliance with reporting,
record-keeping, and other procedural requirements, and the
delegation of discretionary decisionmaking to outside experts, to
satisfy their obligations. So long as adherence to procedural
standards, coupled with the retention of outside professionals, is
sufficient to insulate directors from personal accountability, there is
little reason to expect directors to monitor management closely.
Instead, the proliferation of board committees and the creation of
specialist directors will simply increase the costs of corporate
governance.
How can this culture be changed? Although a complete
development of the appropriate framework is beyond the scope of
this Article, we briefly consider three alternative mechanisms for
increasing director incentives to monitor effectively. We first consider
increased director liability. We then examine changes to director
compensation. Finally, we consider alternative director
selection procedures.
A. Increased Director Liability
Clearly, the prospect of significant personal liability for
corporate failures would create strong incentives for directors to
monitor management closely. Initially, it might seem that directors
already face the prospect of personal liability for failure to exercise
sufficient oversight. The obligation to monitor management, and to
oversee the issuer’s system of internal controls, is a central
component of the fiduciary duties directors owe to the issuer and its
shareholders. As Chancellor Allen observed in Caremark, the
director’s duty of care includes the role of oversight, which includes a
duty to ensure that appropriate “information and reporting systems”
exist to provide the board of directors with timely, accurate, and
230. See, e.g., David S. Hilzenrath, ‘The Company’s Directors were all too often a Passive
Rubber Stamp for Management and Especially Mr. Ebbers.’; How a Distinguished Roster of
Board Members Failed to Detect Company’s Problems, WASH. POST, June 16, 2003, at E1
(quoting investigatory report of Worldcom as stating that audit committee members “devoted
strikingly little time to their role, meeting as little as three to five hours per year”).
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adequate information to assess corporate compliance with
legal requirements.231
As a practical matter, however, directors face limited meaningful
exposure to liability. In cases of state law claims for breach of
fiduciary duty, director exculpation clauses, procedural impediments
to derivative litigation, and liability insurance make the prospect of
personal liability for directors remote. With respect to federal law,
limitations on the exposure of secondary actors—including the
decision in Central Bank232 and the reforms of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act233—limit the ability of plaintiffs to proceed
against independent directors for securities fraud. With the noted
exception of Smith v. Van Gorkom,234 there are virtually no cases in
which independent directors have been held personally liable, under
state or federal law, absent an active role in, or actual knowledge of,
corporate wrongdoing.
The newly developing role of the specialist director may mean
that the directors who perform this role, such as members of audit
committees and QLCCs, will be subject to an increased risk of
liability. Consider the risk of liability for audit committee members.
With the recent volume of accounting scandals, the role of the audit
committee has received substantial attention.  Many commentators
have warned that audit committee members are more likely than
other directors to be sued.235 The extent to which audit committee
231. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968–70 (Del. Ch. 1996); see
also Colloquium, Corporate Law in the Twenty-First Century: The Practitioners’ Prognosis, 25
DEL. J. CORP. L. 161, 174–75 (2000) (practitioners Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & Peter A. Atkins,
presenting) (“When addressing the board’s oversight function, some question may exist whether
directors are exercising business judgment of the type protected by the business judgment
rule.”).
232. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994)
(holding that Rule 10b-5 does not include a private right of action for aiding and abetting
federal securities fraud).
233. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
234. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that the directors were grossly negligent in approving the sale of the company without informing
themselves of the relevant considerations. Id. at 874.
235. See, e.g., Ira M. Millstein, Introduction to the Report and Recommendations of the Blue
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 54 BUS.
LAW. 1057, 1064 (1999) (discussing concern that the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees may expose audit
committee members to “increased risk of class action and derivative lawsuits, if not increased
liability”); John F. Olson et al., After Enron: Issues for Boards and Audit Committees to
Consider, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, May–June 2002, at 14, 14 (“[A]udit committees no
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members will be held liable, however, and the conditions under which
courts will impose liability, remain uncertain.236 Despite the long
history of the use of audit committees and the increasing expansion of
the audit committee’s role and responsibilities, the scope of
committee member obligations under existing law is poorly defined.
With respect to state law, some commentators have argued that,
under Delaware law, the obligations of audit committee members are
simply the traditional duties of care and of loyalty, and the legal
standards for assessing audit committee member conduct do not
differ from those applicable to other directors.237 In particular, unless
the directors have “either abdicated their functions, or absent a
conscious decision, failed to act,” decisions made by directors are
protected by the business judgment rule.238
Similarly, in several federal securities fraud cases, the courts have
declined to impose liability on audit committee members based solely
on their membership on the committee. Most notably, in Livent
Securities,239 the court dismissed as insufficient a complaint alleging
liability of the audit committee members based either on their
doubt will face greater scrutiny in the post-Enron environment . . . .”). Rules relating to audit
committees and the consequent liability exposure of audit committee members continue to
evolve as new corporate governance reforms are implemented.
236. See, e.g., Kevin Iurato, Comment, Warning! A Position on the Audit Committee Could
Mean Greater Exposure to Liability: The Problems with Applying a Heightened Standard of Care
to the Corporate Audit Committee, 30 STETSON L. REV. 977, 987 (2001) (“A review of these
cases reveals little guidance about the direction in which the courts are headed on the issue of
audit committee member liability . . . .”); Olson et al., supra note 235, at 19 n.1 (“[A] long
history of judicial authority and the practical implications of a heightened standard in deterring
board service by qualified individuals militate strongly against any radical revision of the
liability standard applicable to directors.”).
237. See, e.g., Olson et al., supra note 235, at 14 (“Similar to other directors, audit committee
members have two basic duties: care and loyalty.”); see also In re Abbott Labs. Derivative
S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 803–09 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying Illinois law and holding all
directors, including audit committee members, to same standards of care, loyalty, and good faith
in determining futility of demand in derivative suit).
238. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). In a recent challenge to the approval of an executive
compensation contract, the Delaware Court of Chancery held all directors—including members
of the compensation committee—to the same standard in concluding that the complaint alleged
facts sufficient to allow the court to determine that the directors, in consciously and
intentionally disregarding their responsibilities, breached their duty of good faith and that their
conduct fell outside the protections of the business judgment rule. In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 287–90 (Del. Ch. 2003).
239. In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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positions or on the existence of “red flags”—accounting violations—
that the committee ignored or failed to investigate.240
In other cases, however, the federal courts have suggested, at
least for purposes of the early stages of the litigation, that audit
committee members may be held to a different legal standard than
other independent directors. These decisions rely upon the superior
access by audit committee members to internal financial information
and the heightened responsibility audit committee members have to
monitor the auditing process.241 Importantly, however, despite the
expansive language in some of these cases, we have uncovered no
reported decisions imposing liability on members of an audit
committee who were not otherwise involved in the misconduct. Thus,
despite the critical role of the audit committee in monitoring
management, audit committee members do not currently appear to
face meaningful liability exposure for failure to exercise sufficient
oversight.242
The Commission itself has vacillated as to the impact of audit
committee membership on the liability exposure of member directors.
240. Id. at 371–73; see also In re Oak Tech. Sec. Litig., No. 96-20552 SW, 1997 WL 448168, at
*11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 1997) (concluding that allegations that audit committee members merely
held positions on the committee are insufficient to set forth circumstances constituting fraud
with particularity); Haltman v. Aura Sys., Inc., 844 F. Supp. 544, 549 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (stressing
that director’s status as a member of the audit committee, “in and of itself, is insufficient to link
[the director] to the alleged fraud”).
241. See, e.g., AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Dwyer (In re JWP Inc. Sec. Litig.), 928 F. Supp. 1239,
1259–61 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying a motion for summary judgment by audit committee
defendants accused of being “willfully blind” in their supervision of a fraudulent auditor); In re
MTC Elec. Techs. S’holders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 979–80 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying dismissal
motions of defendant members of audit committee on the ground that, because they were
charged with overseeing the auditors, allegations of accounting fraud were sufficiently particular
to them), vacated in part, 993 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Tischler v. Baltimore Bancorp, 801
F. Supp. 1493, 1500–01 (D. Md. 1992) (denying dismissal motions of defendant members of
audit committee on ground that, because members had inside knowledge of issuer’s financial
status, they were required to question information alleged to be inconsistent with other
information available to them); Greenfield v. Prof’l Care, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 110, 114–15
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying dismissal motions for defendant members of audit committee because
allegations of actual knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, fraud caused members to appear
more like “inside” directors than independent directors); Dubowski v. Ash (In re AM Int’l Inc.
Sec. Litig.), 606 F. Supp. 600, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying dismissal motions for defendant
members of the audit committee because their access to issuer information and their
responsibility for reviewing the audit were sufficient to hold them to the same standard as
management directors).
242. See, e.g., Hilzenrath, supra note 230 (quoting Thornburgh Report’s observation that
“over the years, the [Worldcom] audit committee ‘barely scratched the surface of any potential
accounting or financial reporting issues’”).
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On the one hand, the Commission has assured issuers that audit
committee membership does not increase liability exposure.243 Indeed,
the Commission adopted an affirmative safe harbor in connection
with its recent rules increasing the required disclosure regarding audit
committees and the committee members designated as financial
experts. The safe harbor explicitly provides that designation or
identification of a person as a financial expert under the new
disclosure rules cannot be used as a basis for imposing private civil
liability on audit committee members.244 On the other hand,
Commission Director of Enforcement Stephen Cutler has warned
issuers “[t]here is no accounting or financial reporting case that we
are investigating in which we don’t closely scrutinize the conduct of
the board of directors, including outside directors.”245
The current uncertainty is troubling for two reasons. First, in the
face of uncertainty, committee members are likely either to
underestimate or to overestimate their potential liability.246 To the
extent committee members underestimate their potential liability, the
effectiveness of legal standards establishing these committees and
setting forth their obligations is reduced. If committee members view
themselves as facing little meaningful exposure to liability for failing
to monitor actively, they will have little incentive to question
management or auditors or to challenge management’s recommended
course of action. In short, underestimations of director liability
exposure compound the problem of director passivity. In contrast,
directors who overestimate the risk of liability are unlikely to serve as
members of specialist committees or perhaps even as board members.
243. See Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 42,266, 64 Fed. Reg.
73,389, 73,391 (Dec. 30, 1999) (“It is not our intention to subject audit committee members to
increased liability.”).
244. Disclosure Required by sections 404, 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,235, [2002–2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
86,818, at 86,894 (Jan. 23, 2003) (“Our new rule provides that whether a person is, or is not, an
audit committee financial expert does not alter his or her duties, obligations or liabilities. We
believe this should be the case under federal and state law.”).
245. Stephen Taub, Homestore on the Range, CFO.com, at http://www.cfo.com/
Article?article=7760 (Sept. 26, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
246. Compare Kevin P. Kennedy & Deanna J. Chechile, Waiting for Enforcement: How to
Manage Risks for the Audit Committee in the Post-Enron World, THE SEC. REPORTER, Summer
2002, at 9, 11 (arguing that audit committee members face greater exposure both to suit and to
potential liability from claims based in the federal securities laws, including disclosure
regulations and antifraud provisions, in the post-Enron environment), with Rowland, supra note
193, at 207 (describing extent of increased liability exposure for audit committee members as
“insignificant” and calling for a narrowing of existing safe harbors).
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Ironically, those directors most likely to engage in active oversight
may be most deterred by the risk of litigation. In this way, the
uncertainty may rob boards of those directors who are most likely to
provide valuable service.
Second, ambiguity about liability exposure creates ambiguity
with respect to the scope of the underlying obligations. If, as the
Commission’s safe harbor suggests, audit committee members do not
face increased liability exposure, is it realistic to expect them to play
an active role? The recent emphasis by Congress and the
Commission, as well as the NYSE and Nasdaq, on audit committee
independence, member expertise in financial matters, and audit
committee procedures indicates an expectation that audit committees
will provide value to issuers. There is little reason to have an
independent, qualified audit committee if that committee has no
greater responsibility than simply to rubber stamp auditor
conclusions. But what more is required? To what extent are audit
committee members responsible for making an independent
assessment of the quality of the issuer’s internal controls, financial
statements, and financial reports? Absent appropriate guidance, even
the most conscientious directors will have trouble identifying and
meeting their obligations.
A tension also exists between the notion of specialized directors
and the traditional reliance of issuers on the advice of professionals
regarding accounting, legal, and other matters. Longstanding state
law principles explicitly protect the reliance of directors on
information and opinions provided by these professionals, and the
principles provide that good faith reliance is a defense to allegations
of a breach of fiduciary duty. For example, in the auditing context,
the liability of audit committee members is inherently limited by the
fact that, under state law, audit committee members may assert their
reliance on the advice and reports of the auditors as a defense to
claims that they acted wrongfully.247 Reasonably extended, this
principle enables audit committee members to argue that they cannot
be held liable so long as the issuer’s auditors approved the issuer’s
financial statements. The problem with this argument is that
insulating audit committee members from liability so long as they rely
on the issuer’s auditors eviscerates the audit committee’s role.
247. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(a)(2)
(2003).
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Accordingly, if regulators expect audit committees to operate as
meaningful monitors, committee members must face liability not just
when they have actual knowledge of misconduct, but also for
passivity—for failures to investigate potential problems based on
known risks concerning the quality of the issuer’s system of internal
controls or financial statements and other reports. The types of risks
that implicate a duty to investigate might include evidence that
management has failed to comply with requests from the auditors for
information or documentation, material accounting treatments that
the auditors characterize as questionable or high risk, and repeated
disagreements between management and the auditors regarding
appropriate accounting treatments that are resolved in favor of
management. In particular, these types of risks should be viewed as a
warning that reliance by the directors on the auditor’s opinion is
unreasonable due to the likelihood that the reliability of the auditor’s
opinion itself is subject to question.
Analogous principles concerning the role of liability exposure
apply to QLCC members. As with audit committee members, QLCC
members are specialist directors and, as such, will have extensive
information regarding the affairs of the issuer. More than audit
committee members, QLCC members also will have specific
knowledge of potential accounting and other problems, obtained
through the process of receiving and investigating reports of
misconduct. Accordingly, courts will have to determine the extent to
which QLCC members face greater liability exposure than
nonspecialist directors. Will QLCC members be held accountable for
failing to take sufficient actions to prevent, or at least limit, conduct
that, with the benefit of hindsight, turns out to be illegal?
Importantly, Rule 205.7 expressly disavows an intention to create a
private right of action against members of the QLCC.248 If QLCC
members face no threat of liability—a conclusion suggested by this
language—QLCC members will have no greater incentive to
investigate or respond to wrongdoing than the members of Enron’s
audit committee.
248. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.7 (2003) (stating that Rule 205 does not create a private right of
action against attorneys, law firms, or issuers); see also Adopting Release, supra note 59, at
87,083 (“[T]he Commission does not intend service on a QLCC to increase the liability of any
member of a board of directors under state law and, indeed, expressly finds that it would be
inconsistent with the public interest for a court to so conclude.”).
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Similarly, Rule 205 explicitly contemplates that QLCCs will
routinely hire advisors, including attorneys and even forensic
accountants, to investigate reports of misconduct. The natural result
of this process is a professionally prepared report setting forth a
“colorable defense” and concluding that no further action is
required.249 If directors are entitled to rely on professional advice,
then this defense would appear to shield QLCC members from all
personal accountability, eliminating any incentive for them to take
personal initiative with respect to the inquiry.
One might respond to these concerns by observing that the mere
process of hiring independent advisors to investigate reports of
misconduct is, by itself, beneficial. To a point this is true—reputable
accounting firms and law firms are unlikely to whitewash egregious
evidence of wrongdoing, Vinson and Elkins’ investigation of the
wrongdoing at Enron notwithstanding.250 Analysis of a more
ambiguous case is more difficult. The legal standard adopted in Rule
205, which protects the decision of a reporting attorney, and similarly
a QLCC, to refrain from further action, is a determination by an
investigating attorney retained by the QLCC that the issuer may
assert a “colorable defense” in any proceeding related to the
misconduct alleged in the report to the QLCC.251 This does not appear
to be a substantial requirement, and it seems likely that, for most
cases of misconduct—those involving disagreements about materiality
or appropriate accounting treatment—the QLCC and its members
will be able to obtain and to rely on such a determination by the
QLCC’s counsel. Moreover, nothing in the rule precludes a QLCC
from consulting more than one investigating attorney in an effort to
obtain a suitable opinion. In sum, then, for the QLCC to provide a
meaningful check on misconduct, as with the audit committee, QLCC
members are likely to require the incentive provided by meaningful
exposure to personal liability for failure to act. The extent to which
existing law provides such exposure remains uncertain.
249. Rule 205.3(b)(7)(ii) provides that an attorney who is retained by a QLCC has no
further reporting obligations if the attorney is able to assert, consistent with professional
obligations, a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer in any proceeding relating to the related
report of misconduct.
250. See Fisch & Rosen, supra note 16, at 1110–11 (describing the investigation).
251. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(7)(ii).
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B. Changes To Director Compensation
Personal liability for passivity on the part of specialist directors
is, arguably, a second best solution. A more attractive alternative
would be to create direct incentives for active monitoring. In recent
years, commentators have devoted increasing attention to director
compensation, arguing that it, like executive compensation, should be
incentive-based, in order to align director interests with those of
shareholders.252 In particular, commentators have advocated an
increased emphasis on equity-based compensation and the
elimination of benefits such as pensions and health insurance.253
Similarly, commentators have strongly criticized the presence of
consulting contracts and other forms of “side payments” to
directors.254 Proponents of equity-based compensation for directors
argue that giving directors substantial stakes in the issuer on whose
board of directors they serve will create incentives for the directors to
take affirmative steps to increase shareholder value, including active
monitoring, firing unproductive officers, and supervising executive
compensation more carefully.255
252. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63
U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 689–92 (1995) (arguing that paying directors in stock will “incentivize
outside directors in the large public corporation to eschew their traditional passivity”); Jill E.
Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, 34 GA. L. REV. 745,
758–63 (2000) (describing general problems with executive compensation and outlining various
regulatory responses).
253. See, e.g., Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 144
(2001) (describing the National Association of Corporate Directors’ Blue Ribbon Commission
Report on Director Compensation as recommending “paying directors exclusively in cash and
equity, with equity comprising a significant portion of overall director pay”).
254. See, e.g., PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN
ENRON’S COLLAPSE 53 (Comm. Print 2002) (testimony of Robert Campbell, retired chairman
and chief executive officer of Sunoco) (explaining that consulting agreements and other
financial ties compromise director independence).
255. See, e.g., Elson, supra note 252, at 689–92 (advocating compensating directors with
stock); Fannie Mae Corporate Governance Guidelines, at http://www.fanniemae.com/
governance/principles/compensation.jhtml?p=Corporate%20Governance (last visited Sept. 26,
2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing director equity compensation as
“designed to align director interests with stockholders’ long-term value”); Stephen Fowler &
Dave Taylor, Director Compensation and Other Issues: Tips for Startups, at
http://www.boardseat.com/Articles.asp?AID=13 (last visited Sept. 26, 2003) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (explaining that, in general, “the best way to pay . . . directors is with stock
options” because they give directors “an incentive to help the company’s stock increase in
value”).
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The extent to which equity-based compensation provides
appropriate incentives for director behavior remains an open
question. Some recent empirical work supports the argument that this
compensation structure increases the quality and quantity of director
oversight and monitoring. For example, Professor Tod Perry has
found that increased use of incentive-based compensation for
directors is correlated with higher levels of board monitoring and, in
particular, the likelihood of chief executive officer turnover following
poor performance.256 On the other hand, as with executives,
performance-based compensation may lead to higher overall
compensation levels for directors.257 Moreover, at least one study has
found both that higher director compensation is associated with firm
underperformance and that a correlation exists between excessive
director compensation and excessive compensation for the chief
executive officer.258 This study identifies a risk of “cronyism,” which is
then associated with an environment of ineffective monitoring.259
Even if equity-based compensation aligns directors’ incentives
with those of shareholders, it imposes costs on issuers. Equity-based
compensation, particularly stock options, may lead to an undue
emphasis on stock price. Some commentators have questioned
whether the increasing use of stock options to compensate corporate
executives caused them to focus excessively on short term stock price
256. R. Tod Perry, Incentive Compensation for Outside Directors and CEO Turnover 17
(July 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also Rita D.
Kosnik, Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance, 32 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 163, 179 (1987) (finding a negative relationship between the equity holdings of outside
directors and the issuer’s resistance to the payment of greenmail); Stephen H. Bryan et al.,
Compensation of Outside Directors: An Empirical Analysis of Economic Determinants 2 (Sept.
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (finding that the level of
stock option awards to independent directors is positively related to an issuer’s growth
opportunities, institutional stock holdings, and the threat of takeover).
257. This is a predictable result, stemming from the fact that performance-based
compensation entails higher risk and, accordingly, directors will demand a higher overall level
of pay to compensate them for the increased risk.
258. Ivan E. Brick et al., CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm
Performance: Evidence of Cronyism 2–3 (May 1, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Duke Law Journal); see also Graef Crystal, Paying Directors in Company Stock Doesn’t
Boost Performance Compensation: Stocks Don’t Move in Relation to Directors’ Ownership of
Shares, Study Shows, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1995, at D3 (describing study of fifteen top
performing companies and fifteen poorly performing companies for the period from 1987 to
1994, and finding no significant statistical relationship between the equity holdings of the
outside directors and the market price of a company’s stock).
259. Brick et al., supra note 258, at 3.
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performance in the late 1990s.260 This focus, in turn, may have
contributed to management decisions to manipulate financial
statements in order to manage earnings. One could argue that
directors—particularly the members of Enron’s board of directors
who were receiving generous compensation packages as a result of its
high-flying stock price261—had specific incentives to avoid rocking the
boat by inquiring too closely into the nature of the issuer’s financial
transactions. A similar concern might be raised about the Worldcom
board, which seemingly paid little attention to management’s
decisions, perhaps because eight Worldcom board members owned at
least a million shares of the company’s stock.262
Indeed, regardless of its value in other areas, equity-based
compensation is likely to provide particularly poor incentives for
directors to identify and disclose evidence of misconduct. For
directors who are members of the issuer’s audit committee, and, in
some instances, the QLCC, director activism is associated with
challenging decisions that are designed to improve the issuer’s
reported financial performance. In the context of monitoring financial
reporting, director activism will typically have the effect of making
the issuer’s reported financial condition look worse—with a
predictable effect on the issuer’s stock price. Consequently, to the
extent that management is already responding to shareholder
pressure to meet earnings estimates and maintain the issuer’s stock
price, equity-based compensation for the directors is likely to align
the interests of directors with those of management.
260. See, e.g., ABA Task Force on Corp. Responsibility, Preliminary Report of the American
Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 58 BUS. LAW. 189, 193 (2002) (seeking
to explain the failures in corporate responsibility in the 1990s and stating that:
equity-based executive compensation—particularly in the form of stock options—as a
means intended to align the interests of managers and shareholders became increas-
ingly prevalent and lucrative. There were unanticipated consequences. Executive of-
ficers were endowed with powerful personal incentives to meet near term Wall Street
earnings expectations and to avoid any negative impact upon current stock market
prices.
Ide, supra note 3, at 862 (describing the recent scandals and stating that stock options “give[] the
executive the incentive to take actions to increase stock price in the short run”); Lerach, supra
note 224, at 80 (noting that, during the late 1990s, “[e]xecutive compensation also changed.
Executives now got cash bonuses only if earnings reached preset targets or the company’s stock
hit targeted prices. They received gigantic stock options, not to hold for the long term, but
rather to exercise and sell each quarter”).
261. See Fisch & Rosen, supra note 16, at 1120 n.92 (describing compensation of Enron
directors, including heavy reliance on stock options).
262. Norris, supra note 226.
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It would, of course, be possible to provide incentives for active
monitoring by compensating directors based on the actual quantity
and the quality of the services they provide to the issuer. For
example, members of the audit committee who expend significant
effort in learning and evaluating the issuer’s financial condition,
financial statements, and financial disclosures might receive a
significant cash payment at the end of the fiscal year, perhaps based
upon the number of hours devoted to audit committee activities.
Members of a QLCC who conscientiously investigate and respond to
evidence of misconduct might receive a similar payment. In addition,
issuers might pay bonuses to members of the audit committee and the
QLCC for active monitoring—measured by specified outcomes such
as disclosure of controversial accounting treatments in the case of the
audit committee or removal of officers found to be guilty of
misconduct in the case of the QLCC.
By coupling compensation with services provided to the board
and to the issuer, such payments would create incentives for active
monitoring. As with equity-based compensation, however, there are
corresponding costs. One cost is the expense of the payments
themselves, which would have to be substantial to provide meaningful
incentives given the stature and financial condition of directors of
public companies. Second and more problematic is the cost of
measuring the level of effort expended by the directors. In effect, the
approach would entail an additional level of monitoring. Third,
incentive-based payment structures may, as is sometimes reported
with respect to police officers who receive bonuses for making a
targeted number of arrests, produce inefficient levels of performance.
Finally, directors, like other corporate executives, appear particularly
sensitive to their treatment relative to their peers. Differences in the
compensation paid to different directors is likely to diminish
significantly the collegiality among members of the board, which, in
turn, may impair board effectiveness.
C. Alternative Director Selection Procedures
A third mechanism for increasing director accountability is
reform of the director selection process. It is common knowledge
that, although shareholders nominally elect members of the board of
directors, in the vast majority of cases shareholders vote on a single
slate of candidates who are chosen, directly or indirectly, by
management. Because shareholders do not meaningfully evaluate and
choose directors, directors are not directly accountable to
FISCH.DOC 06/21/04 4:00 PM
2003] QLCCS AND ATTORNEY CONDUCT RULES 579
shareholders. As a result, director monitoring is unlikely to be
influenced by concerns of directors about their reputation—at least
their reputation among shareholders. Indeed, to the extent that
reputation operates as a constraint on director behavior, directors are
more likely to be concerned about their reputation for pleasing
management. Directors who ask too many questions are likely to
irritate management and lose their board positions.
Modifying the director selection process to incorporate greater
shareholder input would increase director accountability to
shareholders. Commentators have proposed various alternative
methods of increasing shareholder input, ranging from direct
shareholder nomination of directors to procedures that facilitate
shareholder participation in the selection process.263 Each of these
proposals would enable shareholders to participate more actively in
the selection of directors, which would, in turn, increase director
incentives to act in the best interests of shareholders.
Federal law has generally not been receptive to the idea of direct
shareholder nomination of directors. Although the Commission—
through Regulation 14A264—has largely supplanted state regulation of
shareholder voting,265 the federal proxy rules do not mandate or even
permit shareholders direct access to the election process. Instead,
Rule 14a-8266 explicitly excludes director elections from the list of
permissible subjects for which shareholders are afforded access to the
issuer’s proxy statement. In the late 1970s the Commission considered
proposals that would have allowed shareholders to nominate director
candidates directly, but issuer resistance to these proposals proved
effective.267 By 1990, the Commission had determined that
shareholder proposals seeking to implement greater shareholder
263. See Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REV.
37, 54–62 (1990) (describing multiple types of proposals to permit direct shareholder
nomination of directors); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 224–52 (1991)
(advocating quinquennial election of directors coupled with the ability of large shareholders to
nominate director candidates).
264. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2003).
265. See Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 1129, 1192–93 (1993) (arguing that extensive federal regulation of shareholder voting
through the proxy rules has discouraged development of state law).
266. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(I)(8).
267. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 263, at 62–67 (describing the Commission’s consideration
and eventual abandonment of proposals to allow direct nomination of directors by
shareholders).
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choice on an issuer-by-issuer basis were excludable from the issuer’s
proxy statement under Rule 14a-8.268
Recently, however, in response to calls from institutional
investors for greater director accountability in light of the widespread
governance scandals, the Commission has taken a modest stand in
favor of greater shareholder access to the nomination process. In the
spring of 2003, the Commission directed the Division of Corporate
Finance to examine the current proxy rules and “to formulate
possible changes in the proxy rules and regulations and their
interpretations regarding procedures for the election of corporate
directors” in order to “improve corporate democracy.”269
In response to this directive, the Division of Corporate Finance
solicited public views regarding shareholder access to the nomination
process,270 and on July 15, 2003, the division published a staff report
identifying five proposals for increasing shareholder involvement in
the nomination and election of directors.271 The Commission
subsequently issued a proposed rule that would afford shareholders
direct access to the director nomination process. This rule, proposed
on October 14, 2003 and entitled “Security Holder Direct
Nominations,”272 would permit shareholders collectively owning five
percent of the issuer’s voting securities, under certain circumstances,
to nominate a specified number of director candidates and have those
candidates included in the issuer’s proxy statement.273 Depending on
268. See, e.g., Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 183 (Feb. 6,
1990) (informing Unocal that the staff will not recommend action if Unocal excludes from its
proxy statement a shareholder proposal that would permit any shareholder who owns or
controls at least 125,000 shares to make a directoral nomination); Bank of Boston, SEC No-
Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 206 (Jan. 26, 1990) (proposal to permit any
shareholder eligible to make a shareholder proposal to make a directoral nomination may be
excluded from the proxy pursuant to Rule 14a-8(c)(8)).
269. Press Release No. 2003-46, SEC, Commission to Review Current Proxy Rules and
Regulations to Improve Corporate Democracy, (Apr. 14, 2003) at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2003-46.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
270. Notice of Solicitation of Public Views Regarding Possible Changes to the Proxy Rules,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,778, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,530 (May 7, 2003).
271. Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and Election of
Directors, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, (July 15, 2003) at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/proxyrpt.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
272. Security Holder Direct Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, 2003 SEC
LEXIS 2431 (Oct. 14, 2003).
273. Id. at *55–56.
FISCH.DOC 06/21/04 4:00 PM
2003] QLCCS AND ATTORNEY CONDUCT RULES 581
the size of the issuer’s board of directors, the permitted number of
shareholder nominees could range from one to three.274
Importantly, the Commission’s proposal is extremely limited. As
noted, shareholders would only be permitted to nominate a small
minority of the issuer’s directors. More significantly, shareholder
access to the proxy statement would require a triggering event.275 As
currently proposed, the rule requires that, for shareholders to have
proxy access, either shareholders must withhold at least thirty-five
percent of the votes cast from at least one of management’s nominees
for director or shareholders owning at least one percent of the issuer’s
stock must submit a proposal seeking proxy access and that proposal
must receive the approval of a majority of the shareholders.276 If
either of these triggering events were to occur, then, in the following
year, shareholders would have the right to nominate up to three
director candidates.
There are two possible interpretations of the proposal. On the
one hand, the proposed rule may reflect a shift in the Commission’s
long-term resistance to director accountability to shareholders. The
Commission may have recognized the importance of director
accountability in ensuring the effectiveness of its board-focused
initiatives for governance reform. If so, the proposed rule can be
understood as move away from cosmetic changes in board structure
toward a meaningful attempt to address director passivity.
On the other hand, it would be a considerable overstatement to
characterize the proposal, at least in its current form, as a meaningful
effort to increase director accountability to shareholders. The
proposal is an awkward procedural mechanism that affords a limited
number of institutional investors the theoretical opportunity to
nominate a tiny number of director candidates over the course of two
election cycles. Due to the limited number of nominations available
through the process, most directors will not face any realistic threat of
274. Id. at *88–91.
As proposed, a company would be required to include one security holder nominee if
the total number of members of the board of directors is eight or fewer, two security
holder nominees if the number of members of the board of directors is greater than
eight and less than 20 and three security holder nominees if the number of members
of the board of directors is 20 or more.
Id. at *89.
275. Id. at *36–62.
276. Id. at *37–38. The Commission noted that it was considering a third triggering event—
the refusal of the issuer to implement a shareholder proposal that had received approval by a
majority of the shareholders. Id. at *50–56.
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a challenge. And, due to the two-year cycle mandated by the
requirement of a triggering event, shareholders will not be able to
move promptly to address problems in director attention or
responsiveness. Because of the substantial threshold requirements,
even institutional investors will face significant collective action
problems in utilizing the process.
These limitations suggest that, despite the appearance of
increased director accountability, the actual impact of the proposal
will be extremely limited. Indeed, the structure of the proposal offers
reason to question whether the political obstacles to achieving
meaningful director accountability through Commission rulemaking
can be overcome. Given that effective shareholder voting is primarily
the product of federal law rather than state law, the scope of the
proposed rule offers little promise that the Commission is likely to
afford shareholders a meaningful role in the director selection
process.
This concern highlights a certain irony in the Commission’s focus
on the structure of the board of directors and the independence of
directors. Through its previous initiatives regarding audit committees,
and now through the introduction of QLCCs, the Commission has
sought to formulate rules that specify who is qualified to serve as a
director and that delineate the appropriate scope of the director’s
role, rather than to develop procedures through which shareholders
can identify and elect the best director candidates.277 In particular, the
Commission’s rules reflect its policy judgment about the most
important components of the director’s role. Seen in this light, the
Commission’s approach reflects less of an incursion upon traditional
state corporate governance regulation than a degree of paternalism—
an expectation that it is necessary for the Commission to identify and
mandate ideal board structure and director qualifications because
shareholders either cannot or will not make appropriate choices.
CONCLUSION
QLCCs reflect the Commission’s vision of the ideal corporate
governance structure for issuers to address the risk of misconduct—
an independent committee of specialist directors. By promulgating
277. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 883–92 (1991) (suggesting that a corps
of professional outside directors will increase shareholder choice and avoid the incentive
problems associated with existing outside directors).
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Rule 205, and by providing incentives for issuers to create QLCCs,
the Commission highlighted the benefits of creating a QLCC without
describing the associated costs. Those costs may be substantial. In
particular, QLCCs are likely to increase the cost to issuers of
obtaining and retaining high quality directors, increase the demands
on scarce director time, and create informational segmentation that
may interfere with board collegiality and board-management
relations. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider more carefully
whether the claimed benefits of the QLCC justify these costs. In
particular, will the creation and use of QLCCs lead to more active
director oversight of corporate decisionmaking and reduce the
incidence of misconduct?
In considering this question, it is helpful to look to the analogous
example of the audit committee. The Commission has pressured
issuers, directly and indirectly, to create audit committees and to staff
those committees with directors who meet increasingly detailed
requirements as to their qualifications and independence.
Nonetheless, the extent to which the audit committee operates
effectively to monitor management remains an open question, with at
least some recent evidence suggesting that audit committees have
proven less effective than the Commission had hoped.
The analogy between QLCCs and audit committees suggests that
a rule-based approach requiring specialized board committees and
mandating standards of independence may, by itself, be insufficient to
address a widespread problem of director passivity. In particular,
under the existing system, directors seemingly lack sufficient
incentives to pay close attention to the issuer’s affairs. Rather, under
current law, it may be more rational for directors to limit the extent of
their investigation and to choose to rely on advisors. Accordingly, this
Article considers various mechanisms for increasing director
incentives to monitor, including increased liability exposure, modified
director compensation, and increased shareholder participation in
director selection.
We conclude that the Commission’s focus on cosmetic standards
of corporate governance without paying careful attention to director
incentives should make issuers cautious about rushing either to
embrace or to condemn QLCCs. In particular, attorneys advising
clients regarding the creation of a QLCC should weigh carefully the
costs and benefits of the QLCC to each client. More generally,
issuers, regulators, and courts need to consider the ways in which the
effectiveness of the Commission’s approach is limited by director
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passivity. The Commission, moreover, would do well to evaluate the
strength of its commitment to creating incentives for active
monitoring, such as by enhancing director accountability to
shareholders. At the same time, courts, particularly the Delaware
judiciary, must consider the long-term impact of the move toward
specialist directors and whether modifications to liability rules offer
an attractive way to increase board monitoring.
